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I. Introduction
The New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)
was passed by the 1975 Session of the Legislature and signed into law
by Governor Hugh L. Carey on August 1, 1975.1 Its purpose is to
1. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 612. Codified at N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 8
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Governor Carey noted in his approval memorandum
that the bill was modeled after the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 1975
N.Y. Laws 1761. NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). Originally, SEQRA
was to become effective for all levels of government on June 1, 1976. The effective
date was amended in 1976, however, to provide for an implementation in stages as
follows: September 1, 1976, for actions directly undertaken by the state; June 1,
1977, for actions directly undertaken by local agency or actions wholly or partially
state funded; and September 1, 1977, for private actions needing state or local
licenses, approval or permits and locally funded actions. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 228, §
3.
Pursuant to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0113 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)
SEQRA is implemented by regulations promulgated by the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation (EnCon) and codified at 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 615-
24. Sections 617.1-19 contain rules and regulations implementing SEQRA by estab-
lishing both procedural requirements for the review process and substantive
standards that the applicant and permit issuing agency must satisfy. Sections 621.1-
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declare a state policy which encourages "productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment." 2 In his message ap-
proving SEQRA, Governor Carey noted that the new law responded
to a concern that agencies with the power to grant permits and
approve proposed actions were not giving "sufficient consideration to
environmental factors." 3 SEQRA remedied this condition by com-
.14 contain uniform rules and regulations relating to EnCon permit applications and
requirements. Sections 624.1-.17 contain rules and regulations relating to hearing
participation, proof requirements and hearing procedures.
2. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). The
purpose of the act is "to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and enhance human and community resources; and to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and community resources
important to the people of the state." Id. Although SEQRA was enacted tardily in
comparison with similar laws in other states, New York has developed a wealth of
judicial and administrative opinion with respect to the procedural requirements of
SEQRA, the parties' responsibilities, tasks and burdens in the environmental review/
permit request process, and the substantive dimension explicit in the law. See gener-
ally Nichols & Robinson, A Primer on New York's Revolutionized Environmental
Laws, 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 41 (Jan. 1977, Part I); 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 111 (Feb. 1977, Part II).
See also 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.7, at 9-156 (1980) for a
discussion of "little NEPA's."
The bank of knowledge is further supplemented by federal court analyses of
NEPA. New York courts look to the federal experience as a valuable repository of
guidance for their own analyses of SEQRA. See, e.g., Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v.
Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 481, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (2d Dep't 1981); H.O.M.E.S.
v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 232, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832
(4th Dep't 1979).
3. 1975 N.Y. Laws 1761. An earlier environmental bill passed by the Legisla-
ture in 1972 was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller on the grounds that it would be
wasteful, duplicative, administratively uncertain and costly. Governor's Memoran-
dum, reprinted in [1972] N.Y. Legis. Ann. 403-04. The legislative jacket for SEQRA
contains voluminous correspondence from municipalities, unions, construction in-
dustry associations, bar associations and individual contractors urging Governor
Carey to veto SEQRA. The general tenor of the opposition was that the bill would
"create immeasurable damage to the [construction] industry, which already has been
placed into a very precarious state"; "it will significantly increase the cost of con-
struction in both public and private sectors"; it will "slow down, possibly to a halt,
housing and other development"; "the language of the bill gives only vague and
inadequate direction for developing [the procedural criteria, which] could prove to
be a major weakness." N.Y. Governor's Bill Jacket, Laws of 1975, ch. 612. For a
brief discussion of the controversy surrounding the legislative passage of SEQRA, see
Sandier, State Environmental Quality Review Act, 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 110 (Feb. 1977).
In its memorandum supporting the bill, the Department of Environmental
Conservation observed that in times such as these, it was necessary for government,
private enterprise and the public to work together to "ensure sound and thoughtful
decisions which do not sacrifice long-term social and economic and environmental
objectives for short-term temporary gains." N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.,
Recommendation on Assembly Bill 4533-A, 5 (July 30, 1975) (available in the Ford-
ham Law School Library). Furthermore, EnCon answered critics of the bill by
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manding agencies to fulfill the policies and goals set forth therein, 4
and by establishing a new layer of procedures to be followed as a
prerequisite to permit issuance where the proposed action may have a
noting: "Appropriately, responsibility for the environmental review required will be
vested with agencies themselves, where final decisions are made. . . . The law will
provide a useful, important planning tool for all levels of government, which will
serve to accelerate, not to delay projects." Id. at 5. See also Koppell, Environmental
Protection Law at Issue, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1976, at 1, col. 2. Assemblyman Koppell
states, "[w]hile the statute does require that adverse environmental effects must be
minimized, it does not mandate that any project must be abandoned because of
potential harm to the environment." Id. at 4, col. 1. This may be true, but as EnCon
decisions make clear, SEQRA requires agencies to impose mitigative measures. See
Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 7 (June 25, 1981)
(final decision) (permits issued pursuant to decision dated Dec. 3, 1982; it took
applicant over two years after the first decision on Nov. 28, 1980 to satisfy EnCon
that its mitigation proposals complied with all legal requirements).
4. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
The statute also provides that "[e]very citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the quality of the environment." Id. § 8-0103(2).
The legislative policies and goals are as follows:
(1) "to the fullest extent possible the policies, statutes, regulations, and ordinances
of the state and its political subdivisions should be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this article," id. § 8-0103(6); (2) "the
protection and enhancement of the environment, human and community resources
shall be given appropriate weight with social and economic considerations in public
policy," id. § 8-0103(7); (3) all agencies, whether they be state or local, shall
"conduct their affairs with an awareness that they are stewards of the air, water,
land, and living resources, and that they have an obligation to protect the environ-
ment for the use and enjoyment of this and all future generations," id. § 8-0103(8);
(4) "all agencies which regulate activities of individuals, corporations, and public
agencies [whose proposed actions may] affect the quality of the environment shall
regulate such activities so that due consideration is given to preventing environmen-
tal damage," id. § 8-0103(9).
SEQRA has a simplicity and breadth which encourages judicial interpretation
and, ultimately, through the creation of a body of environmental common law,
regulation of the participant's conduct and delineation of its responsibility. See
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In his opinion dissenting in part and
concurring in part, Justice Marshall noted: "this vaguely worded statute seems
designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of
NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created such
a 'common law'. . . . Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA's success." Id.
at 421 (Marshall,.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The simplicity of SEQRA, how-
ever, is deceptive. The procedure and participation requirements are laden with
obstacles. Confronted by the unfamiliar procedural and participation requirements,
one practitioner compared the experience of the environmental review/permit re-
quest process with Alice's experience in Wonderland. Manes, Alice in the Wonder-
land of S.E.Q.R.A., 52 N.Y.S.B.J. 115 (Feb. 1980). See Town of Henrietta v.
Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 220, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (4th
Dep't 1980) (avowed purposes of SEQRA are achieved by imposition of both proce-
dural and substantive requirements upon agency decision-making).
[Vol. XII
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significant effect on the environment. 5 Where the environmental ef-
fect will not be significant, SEQRA does not apply. 6
SEQRA directed the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation
(Commissioner) to adopt rules and regulations to implement its poli-
cies and goals (EnCon regulations).7 The EnCon regulations so
promulgated constitute the basic procedural scheme with which state
and local agencies must comply. 8 Alternatively, state and local agen-
cies may also use the EnCon regulations as a basis for incorporating
SEQRA into their own existing procedures.' Implementing regula-
tions adopted by lead or state agencies, however, must be consistent
with and no less protective of the environmental values than the
EnCon regulations.' 0 Despite its statutory authority, EnCon does not
have jurisdiction to enforce local or state agency compliance; such
jurisdiction is vested exclusively with the court on judicial review."
5. The principal procedural device for achieving the substantive policies and
goals of SEQRA is the preparation of draft and final environmental impact state-
ments. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Gov-
ernor Carey noted:
The information provided by the impact statement will allow state and
local officials to intelligently assess and weigh environmental factors,
along with social, economic and other relevant considerations in determin-
ing whether or not a project or activity should be approved or undertaken.
With the information which will be provided by these impact statements,
state and local officials will be in a better position to make decisions which
are in the best overall interest of the people of the State.
Governor's Memorandum, reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Legis. Ann. 438.
6. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.5(a) (if action is exempt, excluded or Type II,
agency shall have no further responsibilities under EnCon regulations). See
§ 617.2(a) for definition of excluded action; § 617.2(o) for definition of exempt
action; and § 617.2(aa) for definition of Type II action.
7. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0113 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). In the
rules and regulations, the Commissioner was directed to include: "[c]ategorization of
actions which are or may be primarily of statewide, regional, or local concern, with
provisions for technical assistance including the preparation or review of environ-
mental impact statements, if requested, in connection with environmental impact
review by local agencies." Id. § 8-0113(2)(e).
8. Id. § 8-0107 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (agencies are directed to review
their existing procedures and to harmonize them with statutory mandates).
9. Id. § 8-0113(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Such agency procedures were
required to provide for interagency working relationships in cases where actions
typically involve more than one agency. Id. § 8-0113(3)(b).
10. Id. § 8-0113(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §
617.4. Until an agency adopts its own procedures, it must utilize the procedures in
the EnCon Regulations. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSEnV. LAW § 8-0117(5)(d) (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983); [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.4(a).
11. See, e.g., Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council, Inc. v. Town of
Oyster Bay, 88 A.D.2d 484, 489, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732, 736 (2d Dep't 1982) (although
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While there are provisions for cooperation among agencies, 12 each
ultimately has non-delegable obligations to discharge. 13 The responsi-
bilities so imposed on the lead permit issuing agency (lead agency) 4
do not authorize it to exceed its jurisdiction, '5 but its statutory duty is
enlarged to include consideration of environmental factors. ' 6
EnCon is both like and unlike other agencies. It is like other agen-
cies in its permit issuing responsibilities. It is unlike other agencies in
that it has the central role in coordinating, planning and regulating
the State's environmental protection efforts.'7 Included among its
responsibilities is the promulgation of regulations.' 8 Consequently,
even though EnCon does not directly control local or state agencies, it
powerfully influences the review process indirectly through the En-
Con regulations.' 9 As a result, the Commissioner's decisions are par-
EnCon rejected proposed sewage alternative because it would violate state ground-
water standards, and despite negative orientation of other interested parties, Town
approved proposed action).
12. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.4(d) (agencies are strongly encouraged to enter
into cooperative agreements with other agencies regularly involved in SEQRA proc-
ess for purpose of coordinating their procedures). See generally N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SRv. LAW § 8-0107 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(f)
(agencies shall make every effort to involve applicants, other agencies and public in
SEQRA process).
13. Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council, Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay,
88 A.D.2d 484, 492-93, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732, 738 (2d Dep't 1982) (impermissible
delegation); 1979 Op. N.Y. Atty. Gen. 136.
14. See infra note 28 for a definition of lead agency.
15. See N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsMv. LAW § 8-0103(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(b).
16. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
17. See id. § 3-0301 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (general functions, powers and
duties of Department of Environmental Conservation and Commissioner). The De-
partment of Environmental Conservation was established in 1970. 1970 N.Y. Laws
ch. 140. The law was repealed and recodified in 1972. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 664. The
declaration of policy begins with the statement that "[t]he quality of our environ-
ment is fundamental to our concern for the qualify of life." N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 1-0101(1) (McKinney 1973).
18. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSMaV. LAW § 8-0113(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983) (specifying what the rules and regulations must include). The function of the
rules and regulations is emphasized by the court's steadfast insistence that agencies
strictly adhere to requirements of SEQRA. See Schenectady Chemicals v. Flacke, 83
A.D.2d 460, 463, 446 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (3d Dep't 1981). Agencies may also seek
advice and assistance from EnCon. [1983] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.4(c). EnCon has
published a valuable handbook for use ostensibly by local agencies, but equally useful
for applicants. See New York State Department of Environmental. Conservation,
Guidelines for Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (1976).
19. The EnCon Regulations command agencies to make substantive decisions,
not merely to process applications. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2). Identified
adverse environmental impacts must be avoided or minimized to the maximum
extent practicable. See infra notes 308-32 and accompanying text for discussion of
agency obligations in the creation of an environmentally sound proposal.
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ticularly instructive for an understanding of SEQRA's substantive
expectations for all of the participants. 20
Before a person may undertake any action which changes the use or
appearance of any natural resource or structure,2 1 he must obtain
approvals or permits from state or local agencies. 22 If the project or
activity is likely to have a significant effect on the environment, 23 then
as a condition precedent to the granting of any approval or permit,
the lead agency involved in reviewing the application for the proposed
action is responsible for making an affirmative finding that the re-
quirements of SEQRA have been met. 24 There are three principal
stages in the SEQRA review process: (1) preparing and filing the
application for permits to undertake the proposed project or activity,
(2) holding a public hearing to review the proposed project or activity
and (3) deciding whether the proposed project or activity is environ-
mentally sound and is otherwise in compliance with the law. 25
The environmental review/permit request process formally begins
with the person proposing the action (applicant) filing an application
with an agency having jurisdiction to approve the proposed project or
activity. The application must be accompanied by a substantial writ-
ten analysis of the environmental impacts reasonably likely to result
20. Since 1976, the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation has produced
decisions which address both procedural and substantive issues. The New York Land
Report publishes substantial excerpts in its monthly bulletin. The same source has
also begun publishing a SEQR Report. See Addendum of EnCon Decisions referred
to in this Article; see also part V of this article.
21. See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.2(b). An action is defined as projects or
physical activities, such as construction and planning activities, that commit the
agency to a definite course of future decisions, such as the adoption of a land use
plan. Id. Capital projects consisting of a set of activities or steps are considered one
action. Id. If an environmental impact statement is necessary for capital projects,
only one draft and one final statement need be prepared, provided that the state-
ments address each step (for example: planning, design, contracting, construction
and operation) in sufficient detail for an adequate analysis of environmental effects.
Id.
22. Id. § 617.3(a) (no agency shall approve or fund an action until it has com-
plied with SEQRA). For definitions of "agency", "state agency" and "local agency"
see § 617.2(c), (s), (y). "State agency" is defined as "any State department, agency,
board, public benefit corporation, public authority or commission." Id. § 617. 2 (y).
"Local agency" is defined as "any local agency, board, authority, district, commis-
sion or governing body, including any city, county and other political subdivision of
the State." Id. § 617.2(s).
23. See infra notes 60 and 124 and accompanying text for definition of "signifi-
cant effect."
24. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c).
25. See infra parts II, III and IV for discussion of these stages.
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from the proposed action. 6 It is distributed to all other agencies
identified by the applicant as having jurisdiction to approve the pro-
posed action.2 7 The several involved agencies then determine which of
them will assume the role of lead agency.2 8 If the lead agency decides
that a proposed action will have a significant impact on the environ-
ment the applicant must prepare and distribute a draft environmental
impact statement (DEIS) if it has not already done So. 29
26. The initial written analysis may be either an environmental assessment form
(EAF), [1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.6, or a draft environmental impact statement
(DEIS). Id.; [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(f). See infra notes 29-32 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of the preparation of the DEIS.
27. [1983] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.6.
28. Id. § 617.6(d); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, § 8-0111(6) (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983). A lead agency is "an agency principally responsible for carrying out,
funding or approving an action, and therefore responsible for determining whether
an environmental impact statement is required in connection with an action, and for
the preparation and filing of the statement if one is required." [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §
617.2(r). See infra notes 307 & 363 and accompanying text for comment on restric-
tions to lead agency designation. The law does not authorize the designation of an
agency as lead agency unless it has permit responsibilities.
Lead agency is distinguished from "involved agency". An involved agency is any
agency that has jurisdiction to fund or approve a proposed action and which is not
the lead agency. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617. 2 (q). After the applicant has filed its
application, and the action is determined to be one which may have a significant
effect on the environment, involved agencies decide which agency shall assume the
role of lead agency. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.6(d). If the impacts are "primarily of
local significance" or fall within a particular agency's jurisdiction, "all other consid-
erations being equal, the local agency involved shall be the lead agency." Id. §
617.6(d)(i). Conversely, where the anticipated impacts are primarily state-wide or
the environmental concern is significant, EnCon will probably assume the role of
lead agency. See Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 1 (May 18, 1982) (interim decision) (EnCon sought lead agency status
because of its concern for project's impact on Schenectady/Rotterdam aquifer). Cf.:
Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 25, 1981)
(final decision), in which the Commissioner held that in EnCon's review of shopping
center applications, "the controversial issues ... have consistently proved to be
matters of local concern and are more appropriately dealt with by local govern-
ments." Id. at 9. As a result, "absent a potential for significant enviromental damage
of a regional or statewide concern, the primary responsibility for review of shopping
malls in the future will rest with the local municipality having direct control over the
land where the shopping center will be located." Id. at 9.
New York City implemented SEQRA by Executive Order. Office of the Mayor,
City of New York, Exec. Order No. 91, City Environmental Quality Review (Aug.
24, 1977) (availabe in Fordham Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as CEQR].
Under CEQR, lead agency means the Department of Environmental Protection and
the Department of City Planning of the City of New York. Id. at 4.
29. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.10(c); [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.3(5)(iii). If a
project is subject to SEQRA, the application is not complete until a lead agency has
been designated and it has been determined whether the action may or may not have
[Vol. XII
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The DEIS is the central procedural mechanism of SEQRA. 3° The
applicant must present and evaluate in sufficient, although not ency-
clopedic, detail the relevant facts of environmental impact, reason-
able alternatives and mitigation measures. 3' This enables those who
did not have a part in the preparation of the DEIS to understand and
consider the risks involved by tracing the author's analysis.32 In the
same way that the DEIS is central to the entire SEQRA review, the
applicant's discussion both of alternatives which will achieve the same
or similar objectives and measures to mitigate the foreseeable, adverse
environmental impact of the proposed action is central to the DEIS. 33
Agencies must consider environmental factors as early as possible in
the decision process. 34 Actions likely to have a significant effect on the
environment are classified in the SEQRA implementing regulations as
a significant effect on the environment. Id. § 621.3(a)(5)(i), (ii). Although it is
optional whether the applicant prepare the DEIS, in practice it is the applicant's
responsibility. See N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law, § 8-0109(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983). The responsibility includes determining whether the project or activity is the
kind of action to which the elaborate machinery of SEQRA must apply. This deter-
mination involves an evaluation which compares the project or activity against the
regulatory criteria. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.11. If it has been determined that the
project may have a significant effect on the environment, then the application is not
complete until a DEIS has been prepared and accepted by the lead agency. [1981] 6
N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.3(a)(5)(iii).
30. See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(a). The regulation reads in pertinent part:
"An EIS provides a means for agencies to give early consideration to environmental
factors and it facilitates the weighing of social, economic and environmental issues in
planning and decisionmaking." Id. See also Town of Henrietta v. Department of
Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 220, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (4th Dep't 1980). The
DEIS should be viewed as a method by which environmental considerations can be
integrated with project planning during the initial phases of the proposed action or
activity, and as "an environmental 'alarm bell' whose purpose is to alert responsible
public officials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological points
of no return." Id. The court further held that
[s]ince SEQRA requires an approving agency to act affirmatively upon the
adverse environmental impacts revealed in an EIS . . . , an EIS filed
pursuant to SEQRA must also be recognized as not a mere disclosure
statement but rather as an aid in an agency's decision making process to
evaluate and balance the competing factors.
Id. at 221-22, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
31. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(b).
32. See id. § 617.14(c) ("EIS's shall be clearly and concisely written in plain
language that can be read and understood by the public").
33. See generally Bliek v. Town of Webster, 104 Misc. 2d 852, 864, 429 N.Y.S.2d
811, 820 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1980) ("[t]he EIS requirement is the only step in
the SEQRA scheme which gives 'teeth' to the law").
34. N.Y. ENVTL. C6NsFRv. LAW § 8-0109(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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Type 1. 35 If the agency determines that a Type I or unlisted action will
not have a significant effect on the environment, it must declare that
fact and issue a "negative declaration. ' 36 A negative declaration enti-
tles the applicant to the requested permits without further reference to
SEQRA, assuming it meets their technical requirements. 37 The appli-
cant is also entitled to permits without application of SEQRA if the
action is determined to be Type II, which EnCon has decided by its
nature will not have a significant effect on the environment.3" Where
a decision is being made for a Type I action, however, before the lead
agency determines that it will not have a significant effect on the
environment, it must identify the relevant areas of environmental
concern, take a "hard look" at them, and make a "reasoned elabora-
tion" of the basis for its determination. 39 Accordingly, where the lead
35. [1978] 6 N.Y.C.RR. § 617.12(b) (Type I actions). The Encon regulations
enumerate eleven Type I actions, including authorizing industrial or commercial uses
within a residential district, construction of new residential units which meet or
exceed specifically stated thresholds, and any action occurring wholly or partially
within, or contiguous to, any facility or site listed on the National Register of Historic
Places. The regulation provides:
This Type I list is not exhaustive of those actions that an agency may
determine have a significant effect on the environment and require the
preparation of an EIS. Therefore, the fact that an action or project has not
been listed as a Type I does not carry with it the presumption that it will
not have a significant effect on the environment.
Id. § 617.12(a).
36. [1983] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.5(c); [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.10(b). The
proceedings can be terminated before the second stage by the issuance of a negative
declaration. Id. If the action is a Type I action, the application must be accompanied
by an EAF. Id. § 617.6(b). A negative declaration is a determination by the lead
agency that although the proposed project or activity is listed as Type I, upon review
it can be affirmatively stated that it will not have any significant effect on the
environment. Id. § 617.10(b). This Article will comment briefly on the negative
declaration. See infra notes 39-43. It will not otherwise examine actions having no
significant effect.
37. See, e.g., Bishop v. Board of Trustees, Village of Seneca Falls, N.Y., 81
A.D.2d 1009, 440 N.Y.S.2d 98 (4th Dep't 1981) (municipal parking area within area
zoned for industrial use).
38. [1983] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.5(a). Type II actions are defined as "[a]ctions or
classes of actions which have been determined not to have a significant effect on the
environment . . . and do not require" SEQRA compliance. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §
617.13(a). Twenty Type II actions are listed, including granting of individual set-
back and lot line variances, repaving of existing highways, street openings for the
purpose of repair and maintenance of existing utility facilities, and maintenance of
existing landscaping or natural growth. Id. § 617.13(d)(2), (4), (5), (9). Agencies may
adopt their own Type II list provided that each of the actions contained in it is no less
protective of the environment than the list in § 617.13(d). Id. § 617.13(b).
39. H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Devel. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 232,
418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (4th Dep't 1979) (lead agency entirely ignored parking and
traffic factors). Kravetz v. Pledge, 102 Misc. 2d 622, 629, 424 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316
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agency merely adopts the applicant's conclusory statements, 40 relies
solely on the applicant's submissions, 4' acts without reference to the
anticipated adverse environmental consequences 42 or rests its negative
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979). See also Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). In Hanley, the court suggested that in
so-called "gray areas" lead agencies should "obtain impact statements rather . . .
than risk the delay and expense of protracted litigation." Id. at 832. Furthermore,
"[w]here a proposed major federal action may affect the sensibilities of a neighbor-
hood, the prudent course would be for the agency in charge, before making a
threshold decision, to give notice to the community of the contemplated action" and
to conduct a public hearing "in line with the procedure usually followed in zoning
disputes, particularly where emotions are likely to be aroused by fears, or rumors of
misinformation .. " Id. at 835.
40. See, e.g., Kravetz v. Plenge, 102 Misc. 2d 622, 631, 424 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979) (applicant's EAF failed to mention fact that action
involved a historic district listed on the National Register of Historic Places).
41. See, e.g., Kanaley v. Brennan, 119 Misc. 2d 1003, 1009, 465 N.Y.S.2d 130,
134 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1983) (Planning Board's reliance soley on submis-
sion by developer did not provide sufficient basis upon which to make required
determination that project would have no significant impact on environment.)
42. Center Square Ass'n v. Corning, 105 Misc. 2d 6, 12, 430 N.Y.S.2d 953, 957
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980) (lead agency failed to make required analysis);
Kravetz v. Plenge, 102 Misc. 2d 622, 631, 424 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1979) (lead agency failed to identify impairment of character or quality of
important historical and architectural resources as a legitimate area of environmental
concern). See also Hauser v. New York State Commission on Cable Television,
Unrptd. Dec. (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1983) (installation of cable in front of
property listed on Historical Register is a Type I action). Historic and cultural sites
are also protected by a post-SEQRA statute. See N.Y. PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC
PRESERV. LAW, § 14.09 (McKinney Pamphlet 1982). New York courts have been
steadfast in their adherence to strict compliance with procedural requirements. See
infra note 325 and accompanying text for discussion of strict compliance.
Where actions threaten the physical resources of the area by posing significant
traffic, population-concentration or water-suply problems, or propose the irrevers-
ible alteration of the historic attributes of rare sites, federal courts have required the
preparation of an EIS. See, e.g., Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v.
Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1983) (injunction against demolition of historic
building until there was appropriate statutory compliance); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130, 1137 n.22 (4th Cir. 1971) (construction of medical center for prisoners in an
historically significant community); Businessmen Affected Severely By the Yearly
Action Plans, Inc. v. D.C. City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793, 795 (D.D.C. 1972)
(razing of small shops to facilitate erection of high-rise office buildings); Boston
Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Mass. 1972)
(demolition of edifices proposed for listing on National Register of Historic Land-
marks); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879-80 (D.
Or. 1971) (construction of sixteen-story apartment complex in area containing high-
rise structures). 'See also SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 190, 201 (D.D.C.
1972) (statement is required whenever action may arguably have an adverse environ-
mental impact); cf. Sisley v. San Juan City, 89 Wash. 78, 82, 569 P.2d 712, 715
(1977) (decision that construction of 94-slip marina at head of small bay would have
no significant environmental impact was clearly erroneous where record showed
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declaration on an incomplete record, it has not taken the hard look
required by law.43
If the lead agency determines that the proposed project or activity is
a Type I action, the second stage of the process begins.44 The applica-
tion is publicly reviewed, most likely in a legislative hearing, where
statements of position may be made without the declarant being
under oath or subject to cross-examination.45 If EnCon is the lead
agency and it determines that disputed factual issues exist which
require the more detailed review yielded by cross-examination, it will
convene an adjudicatory hearing46 to examine the facts and to resolve
those disputed issues. 47 The participants in the public hearing 4 are (1)
the applicant; (2) intervenors-objectants, comprising, for example,
conservation and civic organizations, adjacent property owners, com-
munity residents and other members of the general public who can
show some demonstrable social, economic or environmental interests
likely to be affected by the proposed action; and (3) agency staff who
are a part of the permit agency, but separate from the decision-
making arm. 49 Each of the participants carries its own distinct burden
in the public hearing, with the applicant bearing the burden of
proof. 50 The applicant is not entitled to a permit as a matter of right.
Rather, the statutory and regulatory requirements must be affirma-
tively established by a proponderance of the evidence. 5' Although its
reasonable probability that proposed marina would have more than a moderate
effect on quality of bay environment).
43. See Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Board of Albany, 96 A.D.2d 986,
466 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983) (lead agency ignored anticipated cumulative
impacts). Kanaley, 119 Misc. 2d at 1009, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (did not look beyond
applicant's submission); H.O.M.E.S., 69 A.D.2d at 231, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832
(agency cannot act like "the proverbial ostrich").
44. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hearing
procedures and participant burdens.
45. The observation about legislative hearings is made by the Commissioner in
Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 4
(Oct, 7, 1981) (interim decision); see [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(3).
46. See infra note 246 and accompanying text for the definition of adjudicatory
hearing and a discussion of when it is warranted.
47. See [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 624, "Introduction."
48. See infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text.
49. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.4(a)(2). See Concerned Citizens Against Crossga-
tes v. Flacke, 89 A.D.2d 759, 761, 453 N.Y.S.2d 939, 941-42 (3d Dep't 1982)
(distinguishing between decision-maker and staff members fulfilling "their roles as
public servants to provide assistance and information to the applicant").
50. Id. § 624.11(f). See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the burdens of persuasion and proof.
51. Id. § 624.11(f).
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participation is a matter of right, and its burden is lesser than the
applicant's, the intervenor-objectant cannot fulfill his responsibilities
by indiscriminate opposition to the proposed action. 52
The final stage of the review process is decision-making. The lead
agency fulfills its SEQRA responsibilities by filing a final environmen-
tal impact statement (FEIS) 53 and deciding whether the applicant is
entitled to the requested permits. 54 The lead agency has the exclusive
obligation to determine whether the applicant has satisfied SEQRA
requirements and complied with permit technicalities within its juris-
diction. 55 If the applicant requires additional permits, it proceeds to
the remaining involved agencies. Each involved agency has the re-
sponsibility of deciding whether to approve a requested permit within
its jurisdiction, using the FEIS as an environmental data base to assist
it in reaching a considered decision. 56
This Article examines both the procedural requirements of SEQRA
for Type I actions and the substantive dimension of SEQRA explicit in
52. See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text for discussion of intervenor-
objectant's responsibilities and burden in participating in the public hearing.
53. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14 (preparation and content of environmental impact
statements).
54. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(a) (lead agency must comply with SEQRA
before approving or issuing a permit). For the prescribed method of making the
decision, see N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsERv. LAW § 8-0103(7) ("protection and enhancement
of the environment, human and community resources shall be given appropriate
weight with social and economic considerations in public policy"); [1983] 6
N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.1(d) (suitable balancing of social, economic and environmental
factors).
55. No agency can act in advance of the lead agency's acceptance of the FEIS.
See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c) (lead agency must certify that proposed project
or activity meets requirements of SEQRA). See infra notes 421-30 and accompanying
text for discussion of the lead agency's obligation and authority to impose permit
conditions to assure project soundness and compliance with statutory and regulatory
requirements.
EnCon has categorically stated that it, and not any of the participants in the
review process, has the statutory obligation to "make its own decisions on the basis of
the record as a whole and as supported by substantial evidence." See Wilmorite, Inc.:
Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Oct. 7, 1981)
(interim decision). Whether the responsibility has been fulfilled or not can be tested
by an aggrieved participant in a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Id.
56. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(a). For example, wetlands, SPDES (State Pollu-
tant Discharge Effluent System), and impoundment permits are within the jurisdic-
tion of EnCon; curb cut and roadway design permits are within the jurisdiction of
the State Department of Transportation; use and space variances are within the
jurisdiction of the appropriate local municipal agency; and building permits are
granted or denied.by the local building department.
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the Legislature's policies and goals. 57 The embodiment of these poli-
cies and goals is the declaration that all agencies have "an obligation
to protect the environment for the use and enjoyment of this and all
future generations." 58
The analysis is divided into three parts corresponding with the
responsibilities, tasks and burdens of each of the participants in the
three principal stages of the SEQRA review process. It will first
explore the requirement that alternatives and mitigation measures be
discussed in the EIS. It will then examine the hearing procedures,
with particular emphasis on the intervenor-objectant's responsibilities
and burdens. Finally, it will review the lead agency's decision-making
responsibilities, its authority to ensure the environmental soundness of
the proposed action and the means by which it fulfills its statutory
obligations. 59
II. Alternatives and Mitigation Measures
A. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements
Where the lead agency determines that the proposed action may
have a significant effect on the environment,6 0 the applicant must
prepare and submit a DEIS that discusses alternatives and mitigation
measures. 6 This discussion serves a number of different and overlap-
57. SEQRA policies and goals are summarized supra note 4. The Supreme Court
of the United States has stated that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is
essentially procedural, even though its goals are substantive. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978). EnCon and New York courts have been more explicit in stating that compli-
ance with SEQRA is not solely a matter of procedure. Participants must also be
sensitive to the protective policies the law expresses and recognize the expectations
that must be fulfilled. The precise substantive results which are expected, of course,
vary widely depending upon the magnitude, environmental impact and location of
the proposed project.
58. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSEnV. LAW § 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
59. According to the N.Y. State Department of Environmental Conservation, the
"primary function of the environmental process under SEQRA is to fashion environ-
mentally sound projects through public participation." Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam
Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 7 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision).
60. The word "significant" is not defined in SEQRA or the EnCon Regulations.
"Significant effect" means actions which cross critical thresholds necessary for the
health and safety of the people. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1982) (defined by the Council
for Environmental Quality in its NEPA implementing regulations). Under SEQRA
the applicant must compare its proposed project or activity with the criteria con-
tained in [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.11(a), (b).
61. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)(cl) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(f)(5).
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ping purposes. The most important are that it compels the applicant
to consider environmental consequences in the planning stage and,
thereafter, it requires all participants to consider conservation and
mitigation measures throughout the entire review process. 62
The requirement that the DEIS discuss alternatives and mitigation
measures is conveyed in two different ways. First, the simple declara-
tory statements in SEQRA itself require that the DEIS shall include
both detailed statements of alternatives to the proposed action 3 and
mitigation measures proposed to minimize the identified, anticipated
environmental impacts. 4 Second, and more subtly, the lead agency is
required to make a written finding that the requirements of SEQRA
and the implementing regulations have been met before a proposed
action may proceed.6 5 The lead agency must find that (1) the proposed
action is consistent with social, economic and other considerations; 6
(2) reasonable alternatives have been examined; 67 (3) the action to be
carried out or approved is one which minimizes or avoids adverse
environmental effects to the maximum extent practicable;6 8 and (4)
adverse environmental effects revealed in the environmental impact
statement process will be minimized or avoided by incorporating as
conditions to the decision those mitigative measures which have been
identified during the review process as practicable. 69
The requirement that the lead agency make such mandatory find-
ings implies that the applicant has corresponding responsibilities to
achieve certain substantive results. 70 It does not imply that SEQRA
requires any specific substantive result in particular problematic situa-
tions. 7' The requirements serve both informational and result-oriented
62. See generally N. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY
(1982) (Legal effect of environmental law controls on use and development of pri-
vately owned land).
63. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983).
64. Id. § 8-0109(2)(f).
65. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2)(i), (ii).
66. Id. § 617.9(c)(2)(i).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 617.9(c)(2)(ii). See infra notes 421-30 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of permit conditions.
70. See Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215,
226, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 449 (4th Dep't 1980) (lead agency imposed conditions which
applicant sought to have set aside on grounds that EnCon exceeded its legal author-
ity).
71. Id. at 222, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
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purposes,72 and cannot be considered as empty ritual.73 In essence,
reasonable alternatives to the applicant's proposed action which are
capable of achieving the same or similar objectives and measures
which minimize the adverse environmental impacts are interdepen-
dent concepts. Each of these requirements contributes to the end
sought to be achieved.74 The requirement that the applicant analyze
and evaluate alternatives and mitigation measures cannot be satisfied
by merely disclosing adverse impacts. The applicant has to provide
information and analysis which both educates its readers and, ulti-
mately, contributes to the creation of an environmentally sound proj-
ect by stimulating inquiry and evaluation of the applicant's prefer-
ences and mitigation measures.75
B. Reasonable Alternatives
Although the directory provisions in SEQRA and the EnCon regu-
lations are explicit in requiring a discussion of alternatives, they do not
specify the degree of detail and the breadth of coverage necessary for
compliance. 76 The regulations state that the DEIS must evaluate "rea-
72. Id. at 220-21, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 445-46.
73. See Bliek v. Town of Webster, 104 Misc. 2d 852, 864, 429 N.Y.S.2d 811, 820-
21 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1980) (if applicant fails to comply with statutory
obligations, and lead agency fails in its statutory duties, the environmental qualifica-
tion process would be nothing more than an administrative ritual); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 244 per curiarn sub nora. Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Calloway, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974) (impact statement must
be more than pro forma ritual).
74. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d at 221-22, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (SEQRA
requires lead agency to act affirmatively).
75. Id.
76. This is true of the federal statute as well. NEPA requires the lead agency to
"study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative
uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E)(1977). The declaratory mandate
to discuss alternatives under NEPA is as terse as the mandate in SEQRA. See 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1977). However, the Council on Environmental Quality
(C.E.Q.) regulations are more informative. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1976). The
C.E.Q. regulations confirm that the alternatives discussion is "the heart of the
environmental impact statement." Id. The regulations provide that sponsoring agen-
cies shall:
(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alterna-
tives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study,
briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.
(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in de-
tail including the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their
comparative merits.
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sonable" alternatives.77 It must contain only such detail "as is appro-
priate for the nature and magnitude of the proposed action and the
significance of its potential impacts." 78 Moreover, the description and
evaluation should be "sufficient to permit a comparative assessment of
the alternatives. ' 79 The EnCon regulations do not define "reason-
able," but it must be construed in the light of common sense 80 and
limited to the purpose to be achieved."' In attempting to define the
scope and coverage of alternatives, therefore, courts look to the pur-
pose for the requirement in the context of the particular project or
activity in issue. The Supreme Court of the United States has observed
that the word "alternatives" is not self-defining. 82 Implicit in the
Court's analysis is the notion that the range and variety of alternatives
must be limited or expanded according to the magnitude and kind of
environmental risks involved.8 3 Implicit also is the Court's recognition
that the alternatives requirement could conceivably "encompass an
almost limitless range" 84 of possibilities, but that speculating on the
(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the
lead agency.
(d) Include the alternative of no action.
(e) Identify the agency's preferred alternative or alternatives, if one or
more exists, in the draft statement and identify such alternative in the final
statement unless another law prohibits the expression of such a preference.
(f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the
proposed action or alternatives.
Id. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551-54 (1978) (discussing expectations and responsibili-
ties with respect to alternatives).
77. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(b) (an "EIS should assemble relevant and
material facts upon which the decision is to be made . . . should evaluate all reason-
able alternatives and, on the basis of these, should make recommendations") (empha-
sis added). The EIS should contain "a description and evaluation of reasonable
alternatives to the action which would achieve the same or similar objectives. (The
description and evaluation should be at a level of detail sufficient to permit a
comparative assessment of the alternative discussed)." Id. § 617.14(f)(5) (emphasis
added).
78, Id. § 617.14(c).
79. Id. § 617.14(f)(5).
80. See N.Y. STATUTES § 143 (McKinney 1971).
81. See Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 474, 373 N.E.2d 255,
258, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (1977).
82. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551 ("concept of alternatives must be
bounded by some notion of feasibility," if it is to be more than an exercise in
"frivolous boiler plate").
83. Id. The Court observed that the "concept of 'alternatives' is an evolving one,
requiring the agency to explore more or fewer alternatives as they become better
known and understood."
84. Id.
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hypothetical and infeasible is unacceptable because it does not satisfy
the ends intended to be achieved by the law.85
1. The Test of Reasonableness under NEPA
To understand the range of alternatives which the applicant must
consider under SEQRA, one must turn first to the federal courts for
their interpretation of the similar requirement under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).86 The degree of detail and breadth
of coverage required by NEPA to satisfy the alternatives requirement
is measured by a test of reasonableness.8 7 Agencies need not discuss
every conceivable alternative in detail "too exacting to be realized, ' 88
"ferret out every possible alternative" 89 or consider alternatives whose
effect "cannot be readily ascertained" because they are remote and
speculative.9" The Supreme Court has cautioned that common sense
"teaches us that the detailed statement of alternatives cannot be found
wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative
device."'" The applicant, or in the case of federal projects under
NEPA, the sponsoring agency, satisfies the alternatives requirement if
the draft impact statement describes in sufficient detail the range of
alternatives reasonably calculated to achieve the same or similar ob-
jectives, discusses consequences and risks of the proposal, and evalu-
ates and analyzes the feasible options.92
85. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975).
86. After NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970, federal courts quickly
established a standard by which to judge whether sponsoring agencies had fulfilled
their statutory duties to discuss reasonable alternatives. See National Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (statute must
be construed reasonably); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 471 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (to show inadequacy of discussion of alterna-
tives, intervenors-objectants must prove that an important consideration regarding a
given alternative was ignored).
87. Natural Resources Defense Council, 458 F.2d at 837.
88. Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1074 (1st Cir. 1980);
see also East 63rd St. Ass'n v. Coleman, 414 F. Supp. 1318, 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(EIS contained substantial and detailed discussion of north-south location of subway
line; objectant's complaint, rejected by the court, was the EIS did not deal with
extent of disruption that would occur during construction).
89. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551.
90. Natural Resources Defense Council, 458 F.2d at 837-38.
91. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551.
92. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974) (detailed
analysis is required only where impacts are likely); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485
F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (range of alternatives
that must be considered need not extend beyond those reasonably related to purposes
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The test of reasonableness implies a flexibility of expectation. One
court has stated that while the requirement is not "rubber, neither is it
iron." 93 Where the consequences of particular actions are inade-
quately understood because their potential risks are substantial or
because their cumulative effects have not been adequately measured,
the law insists that the applicant be proportionately more sensitive to
environmental factors. 94 This fundamental principle is well illustrated
in cases dealing with large scale projects under NEPA, 95 as well as
lesser scale private projects under SEQRA.9 6 Responsible discussion in
the DEIS requires the applicant to evaluate reasonable alternatives
and analyze their efficacy or limitations in "objective good faith 97
and with candor.98 Consequently, it is insufficient as a matter of law
and a breach of statutory responsibility for the sponsoring agency in a
of project). The test of reasonableness is followed by New York courts. Cf.: Town of
Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 224, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440,
447-48 (4th Dep't 1980) (for construction of SEQRA, New York courts turn to federal
decisions construing NEPA).
93. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
94. The proposition is generally illustrated by applications for which the lead
agency has illegally issued a negative declaration. See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc.
v. Planning Board of Albany, 96 A.D.2d 986, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983)
(negative declaration was procedurally unacceptable because of the cumulative im-
pacts on the environment). It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that any future
DEIS by applicants for permits in the Pine Bush will have to discuss alternatives and
mitigation measures that take into consideration the cumulative impacts.
95. For projects under NEPA, see generally Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1983) (permits authorizing private construction of multipurpose deepwater
port and crude oil distribution system); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v.
Calloway, 524 F.2d 79, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1975) (permits authorizing ocean dumping of
toxic wastes).
96. For private projects under SEQRA, see SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc.,
N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dee. (Apr. 21, 1982) (application to build a
secure land burial facility for toxic wastes); Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept. 14, 1983) (application to convert electrical
generating facility from burning oil to burning low sulfur coal).
97. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1979) (court's task is
to determine whether the EIS was compiled in objective good faith and whether
resulting statement permits decision-maker to consider and balance environmental
factors).
98. See Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Apr. 13, 1982). The Commissioner observed that "it is apparent that the
application and Draft Environmental Impact Statement should have been more
comprehensive at the initiation of the formal environmental review process. While
the Applicant may have met the letter of the law regarding completeness, the noted
shortcoming unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding." Id. at 6. In particular, the
"DEIS should have examined all of the environmental factors involved including the
establishment of reliable estimates of the costs associated for implementing the [flue
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FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
federal action under NEPA and the applicant in a private action
under SEQRA to perfuntorily conclude that no alternatives exist. 99
The reverse side of the sponsoring federal agency/applicant's obliga-
tion to discuss reasonable alternatives is the responsibility of the inter-
venor-objectant to structure his criticism objectively and in good
faith. 00 Intervenors-objectants cannot employ the requirement to dis-
cuss reasonable alternatives as a "crutch for chronic faultfinding,"' 0'
or to transform the review process into a "game."10 2 The lead agency
bears the responsibility for evaluating the applicant's alternatives as
well as seriously investigating alternatives raised by intervenors-ob-
jectants. 03 When weighing objections, however, reviewing courts
may properly consider the extent and sincerity of the intervenors-
objectants' participation in the review process. °0
2. The Test of Reasonableness under SEQRA
SEQRA was expressly modeled on NEPA and much of the state
statutory language is identical to the federal law. 10 5 Consequently,
New York courts have looked to federal cases interpreting NEPA and
gas desulfurization] alternative and not left that task to the ALJ and other parties in
creating a record for preparing an FEIS." Id. at 7.
99. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975)
(dismissive statements that there are no alternatives are unacceptable as matter of
law). See also Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1287 n.6 (1st Cir. 1973).
100. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Agency, 598 F.2d
1221 (1st Cir. 1979). The court noted that objectants' unstructured approach to the
litigation was illustrated by the fact that six months after oral argument they asked
the court, without benefit of any prior agency interpretation, to explain the signifi-
cance of a certain regulation. Id. at 1231. The court observed that "even accepting
petitioners' assertion that they learned of this Guide only recently, despite its publi-
cation in 1974, petitioners had an obligation to raise this matter with the agency
itself." Id. (emphasis added).
101. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 961 (1974).
102. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553. The Court held:
Indeed, administrative proceedings should not be a game or a forum to
engage in unjustified obstructionism by making cryptic and obscure refer-
ence to matters that "ought to be" considered and then, after failing to do
more to bring the matter to the agency's attention, seeking to have that
agency determination vacated on the ground that the agency failed to
consider matters "forcefully presented."
Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added).
103. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Agency, 598 F.2d
1221, 1231 (1st Cir. 1979).
104. Id.
105. Governor's Memorandum, reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Legis. Ann. 438.
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have adopted the federal statute's test of reasonableness.1 0 6 The En-
Con regulations implicitly support the federal test of reasonableness
by requiring the applicant to describe and evaluate reasonable alter-
natives, 10 7 and to measure reasonableness against the objectives to be
achieved.10 Appropriately, New York courts have held that the test of
reasonableness applies equally in determining whether the applicant
has satisfied its SEQRA responsibilities 109 as well as determining
whether the lead agency, in the exercise of its duties, has imposed
proper permit conditions." 0
A project sponsored by a government agency is generally conceived
on a vastly larger scale than a privately sponsored action."' In most
government sponsored projects, therefore, it is reasonable to insist that
the sponsoring agency discuss project as well as planning alternatives
in the DEIS. An applicant for permits to undertake a private action,
on the other hand, may limit its discussion to planning details, 1 2
which may include, for example, site selection," 3 flood control mea-
106. See, e.g., Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv. 76 A.D.2d
215, 224, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (4th Dep't 1980).
107. See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(b), (f)(5).
108. Id.; Webster Assocs. v. Webster, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 228, 451 N.E.2d 189, 464
N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983) ("degree of detail with which each alternative must be discussed
will, of course, vary with the circumstances and nature of each proposal").
109. Coalition Against Lincoln West v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d 483, 491-92,
465 N.Y.S.2d 170, 176 (1st Dep't 1983).
110. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440.
111. See Webster Assocs. v. Webster, 112 Misc. 2d 396, 447 N.Y.S.2d 401
(Sup.Ct. Monroe County), afJ'd, 85 A.D.2d 882, 446 N.Y.S.2d 955 (4th Dep't 1982),
rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 451 N.E.2d 189, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983). Special Term held
that the difference between government actions and private actions justified a double
standard for assessing the adequacy of the discussion of alternatives. The court
continued:
When a governmental agency is an applicant a broader consideration of
alternatives is appropriate for several reasons. Government agencies have
greater financial resources, engage in projects of larger magnitude to
which there are a larger range of feasible alternatives and, given their
inherent power of condemnation, have a broader potential range of alter-
native locations for their projects. In contrast, private developers will
usually have a narrower range of feasible alternatives, due both to their
more limited resources and, as in this case, to the economic disadvantages
of alternative sites which might be available to a developer at a given
time.
Id. at 410-11, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 410. Although the Appellate Division Fourth Depart-
ment did not accept the trial court's analysis, and affirmed on other grounds, the
distinction is analytically useful.
112. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440.
113. See Pyramid Systems, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Mar.
17, 1978).
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sures,1 4, housing density," 5 roadway design" 6 and numerous innova-
tive techniques that will mitigate adverse environmental impact.117
a. Site Alternatives
It is not the government's business to dictate the nature of private
investment, even if government may prohibit the use of a particular
site for policy reasons." 8 In its search for site alternatives, the appli-
cant is not required to consider potential sites not zoned for the
proposed use because such a policy "could lead to the systematic
attack on local zoning and land use plans." 119 Consequently, an appli-
cant's preference for a non-sensitive, properly zoned site may not be
challenged. 20 Indeed, even for an environmentally sensitive site, the
114. See Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (May 18, 1982).
115. See Coalition Against Lincoln West, Inc. v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d
483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't), aff'd N.Y.L.J. Oct. 31, 1983, at 12, col. 4. The
record showed that applicant discussed housing density, water quality, sewage,
private and public transportation, parking, air quality, and the construction impact
on noise and dust. Id. at 493, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 177. The appellate division reversed
the lower court's judgment setting aside the lead agency's affirmative SEQRA finding
and issuance of permits, and dismissed the petition. Id.
116. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept. 18,
1981) (reapplication).
117. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983) (flue gas desulfurization equipment). See also [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 617.14(f)(5). The applicant must also discuss the alternative that "no action" be
undertaken. The "no action" requirement has not been the specific subject of any
EnCon or court decisions. It is probably more useful for public (or regulated indus-
try) projects than for private actions. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State
Dep't Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept. 14, 1983). The administrative law judge, summa-
rizing the major conclusions, noted that the "no action" alternative was not reason-
able because it would not realize. the economic benefits to be derived from the
reconversion. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.,
FEIS Hearing Report 7 (Sept. 14, 1983).
118. Ecology Action v. Van Cort, 99 Misc.2d 664, 675, 417 N.Y.S.2d 165, 174
(Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1979).
119. Pyramid Systems, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Mar. 17,
1978).
120. The relative unimportance of site alternatives has recently been recognized in
Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Flacke, 89 A.D.2d 759, 453 N.Y.S.2d 939
(3d Dep't 1982), aJJ'd, 58 N.Y.2d 919, 447 N.E.2d 80, 460 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1983)
(without opinion). Intervenor-objectant sought to set aside an EnCon decision grant-
ing permits for an enclosed mall regional shopping center on the argument that the
applicant had only undertaken its environmental analysis of alternative sites after
selecting its preferred site. Brief for Appellant, Concerned Citizens Against Crossga-
tes v. Flacke, 58 N.Y.2d 919, 447 N.E.2d 80, 460 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1983). The applicant
argued that SEQRA does not require the investigation of alternatives before selection
of a preferred site, nor does the law mandate that an applicant choose the site which
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issue may still be resolved in the applicant's favor if it can demonstrate
the utility of appropriate mitigation measures. 121
There are two kinds of sensitive sites. The first category includes
those on which unregulated changes may have a direct impact on the
physical environment, such as freshwater or tidal wetlands, 22 or lands
that are otherwise ecologically unique.123 A second group consists of
those on which unregulated changes may have an indirect impact on
fares best on some environmental measuring rod. Brief for Respondent-Intervenor,
Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Flacke, 58 N.Y.2d 919, 447 N.E.2d 80, 460
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1983). The intervenor-objectant argued that the applicant had the
burden of proving that even though the preferred site was properly zoned it was
nevertheless the one that would produce the least adverse environmental impact. Id.
The Third Department held that
there is no merit to petitioner's argument that Pyramid failed to consider
[site specific] alternatives as required by ECL 8-0109 (subd. 2, par. [d]).
With regard to totally different sites for the entire project, Pyramid con-
cluded in the final environmental impact statement that the proposed site
was the only feasible one in the area for the construction of a regional
shopping mall, and the commissioner accepted this conclusion, finding
that it was based largely on Pyramid's business judgment.
Id. at 761, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The briefs filed by the parties indicated that
intervenor-objectant's argument ignored the economic factors which motivate pri-
vate investment and failed to distinguish between that which is reasonable for
government and that which is unreasonable for the private developer. When a
private applicant chooses site "X", it must be presumed that it does so on the basis of
its marketing advantages over sites "Y" and "Z" and that it has rejected sites "Y" and
"Z", even though less environmentally sensitive. The result would be different for a
major governmental project likely to have significant but unquantifiable environ-
mental impacts. In that event, the sponsoring federal agency cannot preselect a site
and rationalize the choice in the EIS. The EIS must adequately analyze the compara-
tive environmental merits and disadvantages of the preferred and alternative sites.
See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d
Cir. 1975) (dumping polluted dredge spoil in Long Island Sound).
121. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Dec. 3, 1982). In addition to the impoundment structure it was designing,
applicant was also required to provide aquatic and wildlife mitigation measures. Id.
at 2.
122. Pyramid Systems, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2 (Mar. 17,
1978). Before an applicant is entitled to a permit to change a freshwater wetlands,
EnCon must make the following findings: (1) that the alteration is consistent with the
legal policy of preserving and protecting wetlands and their functions in accord with
the general welfare and beneficial economic, social and agricultural development of
the state; (2) that the proposed alteration is compatible with the public health and
welfare; (3) that the filling in of the wetland is reasonable and necessary to construct
the project; and (4) that the applicant has no reasonable alternative site which is not
a freshwater wetland or an adjacent area. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0703(4);
[1976] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 662.8(c).
123. See Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Board of Albany, 96 A.D.2d 986,
466 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983) (residential and commercial development in
Albany Pine Bush).
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the quality of life, such as sites that are historically significant, 24 or
situated in a particular kind of neighborhood. 25 In dealing with
quality of life issues, environmental laws recognize that there are
going to be tradeoffs. 26 Consequently, the applicant is only required
to recognize the burdens and show it can ameliorate them to the
extent practicable. 27 In dealing with impacts to the physical environ-
ment, the lead agency's responsibilities and the applicant's burden are
proportionately greater since the long-term effects are potentially
health endangering. 128
Before an applicant may change or alter a regulated freshwater
wetlands, defined as an area of 12 and four-tenths acres or more, 29 it
must unequivocally and clearly demonstrate that the site is necessary
and that no alternatives are available.130 The applicant's task in meet-
124. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.11(a). Significant effect on the environment
includes "the creation of a material conflict with a community's existing plans or
goals as officially approved or adopted," id. § 617.11(a)(4); "the impairment of the
character or quality of important historical, archeological, architectural or aesthetic
resources or of existing community or neighborhood character." Id. § 617.11(a)(5).
See Center Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Corning, 105 Misc. 2d 6, 430 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1980). Cf.: Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th
Cir. 1982) (fact that project contemplated destruction or significant alteration of
buildings listed on national register did not preclude finding that no EIS was re-
quired).
125. See, e.g., Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Service, 516
F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lower West Side of Manhattan); Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (Chinatown); Coalition
Against Lincoln West v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st
Dep't), afJ'd, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 31, 1983, at 12, col. 4. (Upper West Side of Manhattan).
126. For a project sponsored by the N.Y. City Planning Commission in conjuction
with the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan, see Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980).
127. See, e.g., Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982)
(rehabilitation of historic building to be used for low income housing units); Hanley,
471 F.2d 823 (prison facility in residential neighborhood).
128. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Board of Albany, 96 A.D.2d 986, 466
N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983).
129. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0301(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1976] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 662(a).
130. See Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 6 (May 18, 1982) (administrative law judge's conclusion that applicant had not
met its burden of proving unavailability of an alternative site was overruled by
Commissioner because the "findings of fact and the record indicate that the applicant
has investigated other sites and provided an explanation as to why they are unreason-
able from its perspective"); [1976] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 662.8(c). [1976] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §
662.8(b) provides that the applicant has the burden of demonstrating that it will
suffer a "hardship" in order to obtain an interim permit. The Environmental Conser-
vation Law section 24-0703 was amended in 1977, however, to eliminate the require-
[Vol. XII
1984] ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW
ing its burden is proportional to the significance of the wetlands.
Significance is measured by the ability of the particular wetlands to
carry out wetlands functions. 131 The greater the significance, the more
substantial the emphasis on preservation. 132 Thus, in addition to
showing necessity and unavailability of other sites, the applicant must
show that the value of the particular wetlands is minimal 133 or that
the functions can be replaced. 134 If the wetlands is on property zoned
for the proposed commercial purposes, but the lead agency finds that
the preferred site is too environmentally sensitive, the lead agency is
authorized to prohibit development entirely. 3 5 The applicant's busi-
ness-judgment perspective, however, is accorded great deference in
establishing need for the preferred site and determining whether there
is any alternative site available for its proposed action. 136
ment that an applicant prove that it will suffer a hardship. The regulation is therefor
a nullity, Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 5
(May 18, 1982).
131. Included among the freshwater wetlands benefits are flood and storm con-
trol, wildlife habitat, protection of subsurface water resources, pollution treatment
and erosion control. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0105(7) (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983).
132. See Pyramid Systems, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Mar.
17, 1978). The Commissioner held that the Pyramid site contained "a freshwater
wetland of sufficient significance to warrant the full measure of the preservation
emphasis [under state policy]; thus only where an unequivocably clear demonstration
of necessity, or need, and unavailability of alternatives is made can the balancing
process lead to allowance for alteration to this wetland." Id. at 2. See also Wilmorite,
Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 4-5 (May 18,
1982) (application of regulatory requirements depends upon facts in each case and
particular attributes of each individual wetlands).
133. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 1 (Nov.
28, 1980) (supplemental decision).
134. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983). The Commissioner accepted applicant's offer to develop a new five acre
tidal wetland north of the plant site which would provide a substitute habitat of
greater resource value. Id. at 17.
135. Cf.: N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0705 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
136. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (May 18, 1982). See Oneida County's Energy Recovery Facility, N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Oct. 16, 1981), afJ'd, Rome-Floyd Residents Assoc.,
Inc. v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d 990, 996, 450 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1982), afJ'd, 93 A.D.2d 981, 461 N.Y.S.2d 742 (4th Dep't 1983). The
Commissioner agreed to partially "ungrandfather" the project pursuant to New York
Environmental Conservation Law section 8-0111(5)(a)(i). A project already ap-
proved or funded by the effective dates of SEQRA is an excluded action and is
therefore a "grandfather" project. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.2(n). The intervenor-
objectant suggested the need to evaluate alternative sites, but failed to offer any
specific sites as reasonable alternatives. The Commissioner therefore ruled that,
although a DEIS had to be prepared, the applicant was not required to analyze site
alternatives. Rome-Floyd, 113 Misc.2d at 995-96, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
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EnCon's grant of the requested permit does not imply a license to
impair wetlands functions. To protect the wetlands values, the lead
agency is authorized to incorporate into the permit appropriate miti-
gative conditions.13 7 For example, the lead agency may require flood
and erosion control measures, including impoundment structures,13
drainage ditches and detention ponds. 39 It will also accept offers by
the applicant to transfer adjacent wetlands property to the govern-
ment for perpetual dedication for conservation or other public pur-
poses as a substitute for the wetlands destroyed or altered. 140 Even
where a particular wetlands may not provide a significant wildlife
habitat, the lead agency may incorporate into the permit a condition
that the applicant plant appropriate wetland fauna on the project site
to the extent practicable.' 4'
b. Design and Technological Alternatives.
Unlike the deference accorded the applicant's site selection, 42 the
applicant's preferences for design and technological alternatives may
be given no more deference than the suggestions by intervenors-ob-
jectants and agency staff. 43 If intervenors or staff offer reasonable
alternatives which are superior in achieving the substantive results of
137. See, e.g., Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d
215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
138. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Dec. 3, 1982). There was initially some question as to whether the impound-
ment structure was properly designed. Id. at 2. The evidence was inconclusive and,
in view of the significance of underestimation of the design, the Commissioner
concluded that further proof and hearing would be warranted. Id. In Pyramid
Company of Utica, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 22, 1979), the
Commissioner only approved permits after the applicant demonstrated it could solve
drainage and flood control problems. Id. at 1.
139. One permit set forth the following condition: "Construction of the storm
water management system shall be sequenced so that any area which is to be
seriously disturbed will be protected with sedimentation controls." Pyramid Crossga-
tes Company, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 6 (September 18, 1981).
Permit issued October 5, 1981 for Environmental Conservation Law Article 15
(Protection of Water) and Article 24 (Freshwater Wetlands).
140. See Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (May 18, 1982). Applicant offered to transfer ownership of a park parcel to the
Town of Rotterdam as a wildlife sanctuary. The Commissioner noted that such a
proposal meets specific regional public needs. Id. at 6.
141. Id.
142. See Pyramid Systems, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (March
17, 1983).




SEQRA, the applicant must either incorporate the improved design
and technology into its proposal or they will be incorporated into the
permit and imposed as conditions. 144
Since the review process considers proposals rather than final plans
and specifications, and because the applicant's proposed project or
activity may undergo an unrecorded transformation through the re-
view process, it is difficult to identify the applicant's modifications or
compromises except where specifically referred to by EnCon or court
decision. It is possible, however, to draw inferences from the factual
presentations. In Coalition Against Lincoln West v. City of New
York, 145 for example, the court noted that the project, a residential
complex located on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, was substan-
tially modified by reducing the number of units. 146 In Town of Henri-
etta v. Department of Environmental Conservation,147  EnCon
granted the requested permits but imposed significant conditions re-
lating to energy conservation, implying that the applicant's energy
design was unacceptable.148 The applicant's raw proposals for solving
particular foreseeable impact problems, such as designing adequate
flood control measures,14 9 incorporating new residential development
into existing transportation patterns 150 or providing adequate potable
water and sewage disposal, 151 are usually accepted as the basic prem-
ise for examination. The proposals then undergo refinement through
the hearing and permit compliance process. 152
144. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 430
N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980) (only case of an applicant challenging conditions to
issued permits).
145. 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't), aJJ'd, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 31, 1983,
at 12, col. 4.
146. Id. at 489, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
147. 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
148. See supra notes 425-30 and accompanying text.
149. See Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Decs. (May 18, 1982; Dec. 3, 1982).
150. See Coalition Against Lincoln West, Inc. v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d
483, 465 N.Y.S.2d'170 (1st Dep't), aJJ'd, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 31, 1983, at 12, col. 4.
151. See Marriott Corporation, Marriott/Minnewaska Project, N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 2, 1981).
152. See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
18, 1981). The Commissioner observed that the record fully demonstrated that at
each step of the environmental review process the applicant modified its project in an
effort to mitigate adverse environmental impacts. Id. at 6. See also Coalition Against
Lincoln West, 94 A.D.2d at 492, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 174 (significant modification to the
project, included reduction in scale and commitment by applicant to provide funds
to renovate subway station).
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c. Project Alternatives.
The applicant is not expected to evaluate alternative projects. How-
ever, if the lead agency determines that the environmental risks of the
project as proposed are unacceptable, but that the goals of the appli-
cant's project are desirable, the lead agency may either approve the
application with modification or deny the permit request and make
specific recommendations for the applicant to consider on reapplica-
tion.
53
Evaluation of alternative projects may be appropriate where the
potential long-term environmental risks either are substantial 5 4 or
have not been adequately investigated, analyzed or described. 55 This
is illustrated in SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc., 56 an Encon
application in which the applicant applied for permits to construct a
secure land burial facility for toxic wastes.15 7 The Commissioner de-
nied the permits in part because the DEIS failed to adequately discuss
alternatives, and in part because the DEIS failed to describe, evaluate
and analyze future resource requirements, storage and disposal tech-
niques and project financing. 158 The Commissioner held that before
an applicant may be given the "privilege to construct and operate" a
secure land burial facility, it must take "concrete, affirmative, and
demonstrable steps toward implementing currently recognized detoxi-
fication, incineration, or other feasible alternatives."'' 59 The same
concern is demonstrated in applications by public utilities for conver-
sion from oil to coal 6 0 and for waste disposal facilities.' 6 1
153. SCA Chemical Wastes Services, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Apr. 21, 1981).
154. Ecology Action v. Van Cort, 99 Misc. 2d 664, 674, 417 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171
(Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1979).
155. Marino v. Platt, 104 Misc. 2d 386, 389, 428 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County 1980).
156. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Apr. 21, 1981).
157. Id. Such facilities are the subject of intensive investigations and debate in
government departments and environmental organizations. See, e.g., Tarlock, Any-
where But Here: An Introduction to State Control of Hazardous Waste Facility
Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'v 1 (1981); Davidson, An Analysis of Existing
Requirements for Siting and Permitting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities and a
Proposal for a More Workable System, 34 AD. L. REV. 533 (1982). See also Washing-
ton County Cease, Inc. v. Persico, 120 Misc. 2d 207, - N.Y.S.2d - (Sup. Ct.
Washington County 1983) (certificate of environmental safety to place toxic chemi-
cals within a secure "containment site" vacated).
158. SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Apr. 21, 1981).
159. Id. at 3.
160. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 14, 1983); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. (Apr. 13, 1982); Long Island Lighting Company, N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Jan. 24, 1983) (interim decision).
161. See Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Nov. 19, 1982) (interim decision).
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Even if a particular activity is deemed beneficial and has been
undertaken in the past, it must be subjected to the SEQRA process if
its effect on health cannot be judged. In Marino v. Platt,162 a local
government agency approved pesticide spraying for mosquito control
without complying with SEQRA. The local agency argued that it was
exempt from SEQRA because EnCon had approved the pesticide. 63
The court rejected the local agency's argument and concluded that
SEQRA applied. The decision to implement programs that use such
chemicals, the court held, may not be made in ignorance of its effect
on health and the environment. 6 4 The SEQRA mandated "pause" for
studying and assessing the environmental impact must be made before
the local agency undertakes such an activity. 165
C. Mitigation Proposals
The quest for mitigation is one of the fundmental objectives of
SEQRA. 16 If the applicant does not achieve the necessary degree of
mitigation, the lead agency is authorized to implement measures de-
signed to mitigate identified adverse environmental impacts, provided
the measures are reasonable in scope and reasonably related to the
impacts identified in the EIS. 16 7 The applicant's failure to provide
details of mitigation, however, prohibits the lead agency from making
an affirmative finding unless the applicant is prepared to accept miti-
gative measures offered during the review process. 16 8 As a result, in
anticipation of the review, the applicant must develop specific mitiga-
tive plans and be prepared to prove it has the technical resources to
implement such measures for avoiding or minimizing the adverse
impacts associated with the proposed project or activity. 16 9 Beyond the
mandatory requirement to disclose the environmental risks and im-
pacts, therefore, is the implicit expectation that the applicant will
162. 104 Misc. 2d 386, 428 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1980).
163. Id. at 390, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 389, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
166. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 6 (Sept.
18, 1981) (reapplication).
167. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 224,
430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (4th Dep't 1980).
168. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 7 (June
25, 1981) (final decision).
169. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 14, 1983); Coalition Against Lincoln West Inc. v. City of New York, 94
A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't), afJd, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 31, 1983, at 12, col.
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fashion a project which is environmentally sound. 170 Consequently,
the applicant must be prepared, if necessary, to redesign its proposed
project in the light of information generated through the SEQRA
process. 71
A proposed project or activity must be assessed in terms of its
cumulative environmental impact. 72 The lead agency may not ap-
prove one aspect of a project when it knows that another aspect will
result in adverse environmental impacts which have not been ade-
quately mitigated. 73 To adequately assess the scope and magnitude of
environmental impacts, the lead agency may require the applicant to
examine and evaluate not only the environmental impact of the proj-
ect or activity in the immediate location, but also the existing uses and
resources in the geographic area of the project or activity, 74 as well as
planned future development. 75 As a result of such an assessment, the
Commissioner has held, the cumulative effects of the impact directly
related to a particular project may "raise the level of impacts from
insignificant to significant."170
Measures that will mitigate adverse environmental impact most
often include those designed to maximize energy conservation, 77 im-
170. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Apr. 13, 1981).
171. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 25,
1981) (final decision).
172. Kozy Hollow Campground-Marina, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 2 (Dec. 13, 1982) (interim decision).
173. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 25,
1981) (final decision). The Commissioner required that the "impacts associated with
a proposal be assessed in terms of the entire project." Id. at 7. Further, it "would be
inappropriate to approve one aspect of a project when it is known that another aspect
of the project will result in adverse environmental impacts which have not been
adequately mitigated." Id.
174. Kozy Hollow Campground-Marina, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 2 (Dec. 13, 1982) (interim decision).
175. Onondaga Landfill Systems v. Flacke, 81 A.D.2d 1022, 440 N.Y.S.2d 788
(4th Dep't 1981). Applicant commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging En-
Con's positive declaration. The court held that the determination of significance is a
matter of discretion, and that where there is a rational basis, the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the lead agency. Id. at 1023, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
176. Kozy Hollow Campground-Marina, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 2 (Dec. 13, 1982) (interim decision). See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 3-
0301(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). The Commissioner is authorized to assess
the cumulative impacts of a proposal on water, land, fish, wildlife and air resources
in connection with the determination to issue a permit or approval. N.Y. ENVTL.
CoNsERv. LAW § 3-0301(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
177. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d 215, 225, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 448 (4th Dep't
1980).
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prove traffic patterns,' 78 improve air quality,' 79 divert and contain
storm water' 8 ° and improve waste management.' 8 ' Other measures
include the establishment of wildlife sanctuaries' 8 2 and preservation
of historic ruins. 183
EnCon's evaluation of an applicant's mitigation measures make it
clear that the lead agency does not and the applicant may not ap-
proach its task on the assumption that the discussion of mitigation
measures in the DEIS is merely a procedural ritual.'84 As with alterna-
tives, the substantive goal is accomplished in one or both of two ways:
(1) through the applicant's own planning of appropriate mitigation
measures' 8 5 or (2) through the imposition of permit conditions.' 86 The
burden for demonstrating that the proposed project or activity is one
which minimizes or avoids adverse environmental effects to the maxi-
mum extent practicable is on the applicant.'18
178. H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. State Urban Devel. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 234, 418
N.Y.S.2d 827, 833 (4th Dep't 1979).
179. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept. 18,
1981) (reapplication).
180. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Dec. 3, 1982). The applicant's mitigation proposals included a flood control
measure. Because there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the design of
the impoundment structure would have sufficient storage capacity, the Commis-
sioner remanded the issue for further technical evaluation. Id. at 1-2. The proposal
had been one of three alternatives reviewed at the adjudicatory hearing. Wilmorite,
Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (May 18, 1982).
To be entitled to issuance of the wetlands permit, the "Applicant's further submis-
sions concerning the details of the impoundment structure must demonstrate that this
structure, in conjunction with the related stream channel, will mitigate the increase
in flood heights and duplicate flood retention and storage capabilities of the elimi-
nated wetlands. ... Id. at 5.
181. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983).
182. See, e.g., Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 18, 1981). The applicant agreed to relocate the proposed mall building to
protect a colony of Karner Blue butterflies. The Commissioner noted that "this
relocation, in conjunction with the proposed management plan for the conservation
of the butterfly habitat on site, is a reasonable attempt to protect an endangered
species on the site and still carry out the project." Id. at 4.
183. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (May 18, 1982).
184. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 14, 1983); Town of Marbletown, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Oct. 21, 1982) (interim decision).
185. See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(f)(7).
186. See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2)(ii).
187. See [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.11(f). See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 25, 1981) (final decision). The Commissioner
stated that "SEQR[A] requires agencies to impose mitigative conditions that mini-
mize adverse environmental impact, but in order to do so, the mitigation must be
clearly identified and described in the FEIS." Id. at 7.
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D. Applicant Preferences
Although the applicant must discuss and evaluate reasonable alter-
natives and mitigation measures in the DEIS, the central focus of the
review process is the applicant's expressed preference.18 8 Preferences,
however, are only acceptable if the applicant carries its burden of
proving that they avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts
to the maximum extent practicable. 8 9 The lead agency is authorized
to grant approval for a modified project, 90 and to reject the appli-
cant's preferences in favor of other alternatives.' 9' In one application,
a public utility applied for permits to convert two of its electrical
generating facilities from oil burning to low sulfur coal burning facili-
ties. 9 2 The Commissioner found the applicant's preference would
result in releasing into the atmosphere an unacceptably high volume
of chemicals that produce sulphuric acid and nitric acid.9 3 These
acids return to the earth in the form of precipitation-popularly
known as acid rain.9 4 As a result, the Commissioner approved one of
the alternatives developed by intervenors-objectants in the public
hearings. The approved alternative required the applicant to install
and use flue gas desulfurization equipment which significantly re-
duces the level of unacceptable pollutants.9 5
In another application involving a request for permits to build a
shopping center on a site containing a freshwater wetlands, the appli-
188. Ecology Action v. Van Cort, 99 Misc. 2d 664, 417 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct.
Tompkins County 1979). It is irrelevant that the intervenor-objectant would have
preferred that the property be used as a housing complex, or that the EIS should have
considered such an alternative. Id. at 675, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 174. See Orange &
Rockland Utilities, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 5 (Apr. 13, 1982).
Whether it is a federal agency sponsor under NEPA or a private developer applicant
under SEQRA, the proponent of a project or activity has the burden of defending its
choices. In Orange & Rockland, the applicant failed to demonstrate that the pre-
ferred alternative would not cause a significant adverse environmental impact or
likelihood of contamination of the groundwater. Id. at 5.
189. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983).
190. See, e.g., Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. (May 18, 1982). The Commissioner explained that while the appli-
cant's preferred project could not be approved, the alternatives described in his
decision would minimize or avoid adverse environmental impacts to the maximum
extent practicable. Id. at 1.
191. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983).
192. Id.
193. Id. (among possible adverse impacts was damage from acid rain).
194. Id. at 6.
195. Id. at 11-12.
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cant proposed an impoundment plan as part of its flood control
proposal, but had difficulty demonstrating that it could achieve its
purpose. 9 6 The application was approved only after the applicant
submitted further information that enabled the Commissioner to
make an informed decision. 97
Since an applicant is entitled to an affirmative SEQRA determina-
tion only after it has conclusively demonstrated compliance,198 a pref-
erence acceptable to the lead agency, but contingent upon approval
by another municipality, is unacceptable as a matter of law. 19 Conse-
quently, if the applicant's preference is not accepted, the application
will not be approved in the proposed form. 20 0 The lead agency may
not ignore evidence that an applicant's preferred alternative could
produce unacceptable environmental consequences.20 In addition,
the applicant must complete negotiations with third parties 20 2 con-
cerning its preferred mitigation measures before its application will be
approved.
E. Intervenor-Objectant's Burden of Going Forward
Once the applicant has either carried its burden of describing ap-
propriate alternatives and mitigative measures or has incorporated
alternatives proposed by EnCon staff or intervenor-objectants into its
proposed project or activity, the burden shifts to the intervenor-ob-
jectant to prove that more feasible alternatives or mitigative measures
196. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (May 18, 1982). In a final decision more than a year later, the Commissioner
concluded that the applicant's design of its impoundment structure was reasonable.
Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 1 (July
1, 1983).
197. Id.
198. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dept. of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 25,
1981).
199. Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council, Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay,
88 A.D.2d 484, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732 (2d Dep't 1982).
200. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (May 18, 1982).
201. Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67
(2d Dep't 1981).
202. Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. (Nov. 19, 1982) (interim decision). The requirement that the appli-
cant obtain such definite agreements "need not involve a delay in the proceedings."
Id. at 2. The applicant must, however, make the "disposal agreements available to
all parties for review and comment." Id. According to the Commissioner, an adjudi-
catory hearing would then depend upon whether the mitigative measures proposed
raise substantive and significant issues. Id.
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exist which the applicant failed to discuss in the DEIS or the lead
agency overlooked .203
III. Responsibilities of Participants in the Public Hearing
The primary function of the environmental review process under
SEQRA is to fashion environmentally sound projects through public
participation. °4 Public participation under SEQRA commences after
the filing of the DEIS while the applicant's plans are still prelimi-
nary 205 and before any irrevocable commitments have been made or
irreversible damage committed to the environment. 20 6 It consists of
commenting on the permit and environmental issues raised in the
application and impact statement 207 and actively participating in the
public hearing. 20 8 The desire to participate implies a willingness to
contribute, which in turn implies responsible participation. The inter-
venor-objectant's contribution must be concrete and objective, 20 9
rather than vague and subjective. 210
203. See Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision). Where mitigation or avoidance of adverse
environmental impact is possible and practicable, SEQRA requires that it be incorpo-
rated into the project "regardless of the source of such proof." Id. at 7. "Where
mitigation is not possible, it is conceivable (regardless of the source of proof) that the
degree of environmental harm, on balance with social and economic factors related
to the project, may warrant denial of permits." Id; accord Sierra Club v. Morton,
510 F.2d 813, 818-19 (5th Cir. 1975) (party challenging adequacy of EIS is required
to establish by preponderance of evidence a showing of deficiencies).
204. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
7 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision). The Commissioner stated that the "process
attempts to expose a project's potential for adverse environmental harm and establish
measures which will avoid or minimize such harm." Id. at 7.
205. See Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215,
220, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (4th Dep't 1980) (purpose of review "is to alert responsi-
ble public officials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological
points of no return").
206. Id. at 221-22, 430 N.Y.2d at 446.
207. See, e.g., Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 1-2 (Apr. 2, 1982) (explaining hearing participation and issues
conference); see also [1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.8(c) (agency shall provide period for
commenting on DEIS of not less than 30 days).
208. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.4(a), (b) (hearing participation); id. § 624.5
(rights of parties).
209. See infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text. The frequency with which the
Commissioner discusses intervenors-objectants' quality of proof and failure of proof
in his decisions implies that intervenors-objectants are not always aware of their
burden in the public hearing.
210. See infra notes 256-63 and accompanying text. The existence of subjective




The participants in the public review portion of the environmental
process are the applicant, assigned agency staff and the intervenor-
objectant.21 ' The applicant and agency staff each have defined statu-
tory roles, with concomitant responsibilities and burdens; the former
to prove entitlement to the requested permits and the latter to exam-
ine the proposed action for compliance with applicable law. The
intervenor-objectant, however, participates on a voluntary basis. 212
Nevertheless, the intervenor-objectant is expected to fulfill the func-
tional role of questioning the application and the DEIS, producing
facts, raising issues and offering proof.2 13 Both the agency staff and
intervenor-objectant are concerned with creating an environmentally
sound project regardless of cost. 214 To that extent, they share the
common goal of putting the applicant to its proof and offering addi-
tional alternatives to achieve the same or similar objectives which
that the intervenor-objectant's proof lacked specificity, or, as in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 554
(1978), intervenor-objectant declined to focus its contentions because it had no
conventional findings to offer.
211. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.4(a). Although there are naturally tensions among
the participants in the review process created by conflicting viewpoints and positions
about how best to undertake the proposed actions with the least environmental
impact, ultimately the process has to involve a cooperative effort among them for the
purpose of creating an environmentally sound project.
212. Id. § 624.4(a)(3). If a hearing involves numerous parties, the administrative
law judge has the authority to consolidate parties for purposes of avoiding repetitious
testimony or argument. Id. § 624.4(h). See Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y.
State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Oct. 7, 1981). The Commissioner stated that the
consolidation of parties "significantly enhances the efficiency of administrative hear-
ings at no expense to fairness. Indeed, it affords a beneficial opportunity for the
consolidated parties to concentrate and refine their concerns as well as to more
efficiently pursue them by eliminating needless duplicative efforts." Id. at 2. In the
event there is a divergence of views with respect to any particular issue, intervenor-
objectants are free to seek severance of their consolidated status. Long Island Light-
ing Company, N.Y. State Dep't Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Jan. 24, 1983) (interim
decision).
213. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 14, 1983). Six different alternatives were developed in the adjudicatory hear-
ing, four of them by intervenors. Id, at 5.
214. Id. Even though the approved alternative involved substantially higher capi-
tal construction and associated long-term operational costs, .it could be financed out
of reduced savings to applicant's ratepayers. The Commissioner stated that the
associated employment opportunities in undertaking the capital project should be
regarded as a positive economic benefit. Id. at 11.
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avoid or minimize anticipated adverse environmental impacts to the
maximum extent practicable. 21 5
The intervenor-objectant has the right to participate in a public
hearing either in a full or limited capacity. 216 If he desires full party
status, however, he must demonstrate entitlement by identifying his
grounds of opposition to the proposed action and the nature of the
arguments and evidence he intends to present. 21 7 Alternatively, if the
intervenor-objectant merely seeks to register a position, he may make
a limited appearance. 21 8 An intervenor-objectant's standing to ques-
tion an EnCon application is determined by the Commissioner's rep-
resentative, the administrative law judge, either before the legislative
hearing or at a preadjudication issues conference. 219 The decision to
grant or deny participation is subject to interagency appeal to the
Commissioner. 220
Other involved agencies are strongly encouraged to participate in
the lead agency's public hearing review. In their role either as a party
or in a consultative capacity, the agencies contribute knowledge and
experience in their respective areas of expertise and jurisdiction.22'
215. Id. Agency staff recommended disapproval of the application because appli-
cant did not have a definite solid waste disposal plan. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y.
State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., FEIS/Hearing Report 25 (Sept. 14, 1983).
216. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.4(b), (g).
217. Id. § 624.4(b)(1), (2) (prospective intervenor-objectant must also identify his
social, economic or environmental interests which are likely to be affected by pro-
posed action). See also Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. (Oct. 7, 1983). Qualified persons are given the opportunity to insure
that the record contains all the environmental impacts, alternatives and mitigation
measures that the Commissioner must consider in making his final decision. Id. at 3.
218. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.4(g).
219. Id. § 624.6(a). When possible, an issues conference will be scheduled in
advance of the public hearing. See infra note 246 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the issues conference. The Commissioner has stated that it is not the
intention of the regulations to raise a "set of procedural hurdles" to prevent public
participation. Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. (Apr. 2, 1982). Such an interpretation would contravene the clear
legislative mandate for meaningful public participation by "focusing form over
substance." Id. at 2. The Commissioner emphasized that the regulations provide
broad discretion to the administrative law judge which must be exercised to facilitate
public input. Id. The threshold is similarly low for judicial review of agency decision
making. See New York State Builders Ass'n v. New York, 98 Misc. 2d 1045, 414
N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1979). In order to show standing, however, a
party must allege injuries within the zone of interests protected by SEQRA. Id. at
1050, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 959. Economic injury alone is not within the zone of interests
and cannot serye as a basis for standing under SEQRA. Id. See also infra notes 369-72
and accompanying text for further discussion of economic considerations.
220. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.4(f).
221. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(h). See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 1 (Nov. 28, 1980) (local officials have responsibility for
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This consultation and participation contributes to narrowing issues of
significance and identifying areas of controversy. 222 The public hear-
ing also gives the involved agency an opportunity to obtain a data base
for its own decision making process. 22 3 Although an agency's partici-
pation in the lead agency's public hearing its voluntary, its failure to
participate when its presence would aid decision making violates the
clear mandate of SEQRA for "expedited proceedings, prompt compre-
hensive review and coordinated actions between agencies. ' 224 In addi-
tion, such absence precludes the agency from subsequently challeng-
ing the lead agency's findings. 225
B. Public Hearings226
If staff evaluation or comments by the intervenor-objectant on the
application and DEIS raise "substantive and significant issues," a
seeing that a record is developed which adequately reflects zoning policies and
practices in affected locale).
222. Id. § 617.3(f).
223. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., Hearing/
Report FEIS 19 (Sept. 14, 1983).
224. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 5
(Oct. 7, 1981); see also Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Nov. 28, 1980), the Commissioner stated that the "success of the review process
is dependent upon the willingness of involved agencies to contribute their special
areas of expertise throughout the process." Id. at 1. Further, it "is not an opportunity
for involved agencies to avoid controversial subject matter within their specific
official authority by deferring the solution of a controversy to the lead agency." Id.
225. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Oct. 7, 1980). The acceptance of the FEIS by the lead agency binds all decision
makers to the information contained therein. Id. at 5. Cf. CAL. PUB, RES. CODE §
21080.1 (West 1977). "The lead agency shall have the responsibility for determining
whether an environmental impact report or a negative declaration shall be required
for any project .... Such determination shall be final and conclusive on all persons,
including responsible agencies .... Id.
226. EnCon uses both legislative hearings, [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(a)(3), and
issues conferences, [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.6, to fulfill its obligations. The two
devices are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. This section of the Article
deals principally with EnCon as the designated lead agency. Except for the legisla-
tive-type hearing referred to in the EnCon regulations as an "issues conference",
hearing procedures for other agencies and proof burdens on the participants are
identical to EnCon's. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Town of
Guilderland, 91 A.D.2d 763, 458 N.Y.S.2d 13 (3d Dep't 1982). In Concerned Citi-
zens, there was substantial opposition to the proposed action on the local level. At
issue was a special use permit. Before making its final decision, the zoning board of
appeals had conducted 10 public hearings and had held three special meetings. The
court found that
[a]pproximately 100 witnesses were heard and thousands of pages of ex-
hibits and written testimony were received. Petitioners were granted full
party status by the zoning board and vigorously participated throughout
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public hearing is mandatory. 227 A "substantive and significant" issue is
one that is likely to affect the decision to issue the permit. 228 Other-
wise, the lead agency's decision to hold a public hearing on environ-
mental issues is discretionary. 229 Whether the lead agency has properly
exercised discretion depends in part on the degree of public interest, as
reflected in the comments it receives, 230 and in part on the extent to
which a public hearing will aid the agency decision making processes
by providing a forum for soliciting additional public comment. 23 1
There are two types of public hearings: the legislative hearing and
the adjudicatory hearing. The legislative hearing is a limited forum in
which participants are given the opportunity to voice positions and
present arguments. 232 The adjudicatory hearing is a more formal,
evidentiary type proceeding presided over by an administrative law
judge in which participants may proffer evidence and examine and
cross-examine witnesses. 233 While a legislative hearing may not be
necessary for all environmental issues, it is mandatory for particular
types of permits. 23 4 Most combined SEQRA/permit hearings are legis-
the hearing process. The mere fact that the zoning board finally deter-
mined that the hearings should be concluded, at a time when petitioners
still wished to be heard on the matter, does not ipso facto constitute a
violation of petitioners' rights. The record reveals that petitioners had
ample opportunity to present their objections to the Pyramid applications
Id. at 763, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
227. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSEHV. LAW § 70-0119(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
228. Id. (hearing required where there is reasonable likelihood that permit will be
denied or can be granted only with major modifications).
229. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.7(a).
230. Under the EnCon regulations, intervenors-objectants have the opportunity,
in advance of any hearing, to file written comments on the application and DEIS and
to raise permit and environmental issues. The lead agency is required to consider
these comments in deciding whether to convene a hearing. The commenting period
on the DEIS may not be less than 30 days. The applicant and agency staff may, but
are not required to, respond. They may prefer to wait until the issues conference.
[1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.8(c). Regarding EnCon permits, see [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 621.7(a) (EnCon shall evaluate application and any comments received on it to
determine whether public hearing must be held).
231. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.8(d).
232. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(a)(3).
233. The adjudicatory hearing is governed by the N.Y. State Administrative Pro-
cedures Act (McKinney Pamphlet 1982).
234. Public hearings are mandatory, for example, for freshwater wetlands per-
mits, N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsMv. LAW § 24-0703 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983), and for
zoning permits, N.Y. TOWN LAW § 264 (McKinney 1965). Hearings are discretionary
for impoundment and water supply permits. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSEv. LAW. § 15-0903
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). The decision whether to convene a public hearing is




lative. 235 There is no statutory requirement for convening an adjudica-
tory hearing to resolve issues raised in the DEIS. 236 EnCon's decision
to convene an adjudicatory hearing for resolution of issues affecting
permit issuance is a matter of policy rather than of right.2 37
1. Function of the Hearing
There are three principal functions of the public hearing: to resolve
disputed issues of fact, 238 to ensure to the extent practicable that
projects avoid creating unacceptable environmental consequences af-
ter they are constructed 239 and to create a record for the lead agency
to support its environmental determination. 240 A disputed issue of fact
is one which is significant enough to affect permit issuance. 24' A fact
235. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
4 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision); [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.8(d)(2) (when a
SEQRA hearing is to be held, it shall be incorporated into existing procedures).
236. Section 70-0119(1) of the Environmental Conservation Law only refers to
"public hearings." See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 70-0119(1) (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983).
237. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 4 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision) (nothing in article 8 of Environmental
Conservation Law, EnCon regulations or Uniform Procedures Act requires lead
agency to utilize adjudicatory hearing forum for purpose of resolving or responding
to comments on DEIS). See also infra note 246 (Wilmorite quotation).
238. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 624. The introduction states:
It is the policy of the department to ensure that the public hearings it
conducts provide a fair and efficient mechanism for the development of a
factual record for the decision on a permit and, to that end, that all
statements and testimony be relevant and directed toward achieving that
goal. The process ... may involve a legislative hearing session on a draft
environmental impact statement, [or] an adjudicatory hearing session
with sworn testimony and cross-examination . ...
Id.
239. Town of Marbletown, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 6 (Oct. 21,
1982) (interim decision).
240. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.15(b). A record is created in several different
ways: comments on the DEIS and application received from interested persons who
may subsequently qualify as intervenors in the public hearing, [1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. §
617.8(c); substantive responses of applicant and agency staff to the comments, [1982]
6 N.Y.C.R.R. §617.14(h); and the testimonial transcript and exhibits in the adjudica-
tory hearing, [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(d). The lead agency has no authority to
vary the regulatory procedures by lightening the burdens and responsibilities of
applicant and agency. See Glen Head v. Oyster Bay, 88 A.D.2d 484, 495, 453
N.Y.S.2d 732, 739 (2d Dep't 1982) (lead agency failed to consider negative informa-
tion from other involved agencies or to forward DEIS to person requesting copy);
Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67 (2d
Dep't 1981) (lead agency failed to prepare EIS).
241. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 70-0119(1) (McKinney 1982-1983).
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which does not affect permit issuance is by definition not material or
relevant 242
To raise a disputed issue of fact, a party must offer competent
testimony which runs counter to the applicant's assertions in its appli-
cation and in the DEIS and affirmatively identify specific grounds to
support the lead agency in denying the application or imposing signifi-
cant conditions on the requested permit. 243 The party seeking to show
that an issue is substantive and significant has the burden of persua-
sion on that issue. 244 If agency staff has evaluated the issues in an
application submitted to EnCon and not objected to the issuance of
the requested permit, the subsequent review and acceptance of the
application is comparable to that which is given to uncontroverted
applications not subject to a hearing. 245
2. The Issues Conference
The issues conference, although not a mandatory procedure for all
lead agencies, is utilized by EnCon as a means of ensuring a fair and
efficient preliminary review of issues identified by agency staff and
intervenors-objectants. 246 The purpose of the issues conference is to
242. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
243. Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 2 (Apr. 2, 1982).
244. Id.
245. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
3 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision).
246. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Oct.
7, 1981) (interim decision). In Wilmorite, the Commissioner stated:
To meet the dual requirements of SEQR[A] and SAPA in a fair and
efficient manner, the Department has chosen to bifurcate or separate its
treatment of EIS-related issues between those that are likely to affect
permit issuance and those that are not. The former will be subjected to the
rigors of the adjudicatory process to develop responses for the FEIS, the
latter will not. The bifurcation is accomplished . . . by a legislative hear-
ing upon the DEIS coupled with an opportunity for the parties to assert
what issues they contend should be in the former category, followed by a
determination by the ALJ.
Id. at 4. See also Letter from EnCon to counsel representing Miracle Mile, Inc., (July
12, 1979). The letter states:
While it can be argued that a legislative-type hearing on SEQR[A] issues
could be useful in determining the adequacy of a draft [environmental]
impact statement, nevertheless for this Department the issues of substan-
tive importance within that EIS, together with those in the related [per-
mit] application, generally require the more detailed review which cross
examination yields, especially in view of the need for a sufficient basis for
making the findings required by 6 NYCRR 617.9 and for fully uncovering
the "state of the art" within the technical disciplines involved.
Id. at 2.
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narrow and define the scope of the issues as subjects for the adjudica-
tory hearing. 247 Before an adjudicatory hearing may be commenced,
however, the party that seeks the hearing has the burden of persuad-
ing EnCon that the identified issues are substantive and significant. 248
To raise substantive and significant issues, a party must be able to
show contested facts significant enough to step over a "threshold
requirement of materiality. " 249 The assertions must be based on fact
and supported by proof.210 The existence of such a requirement means
that the intervenor-objectant must be able to distinguish subjective
from objective factors and to recognize quality of proof as it relates to
particular issues. Even if the administrative law judge is not as rigor-
ous in excluding evidence as a judge in a plenary trial, there is no
essential difference as to what constitutes relevance and materiality.
In order to carry its burden, the party must make a showing sufficient
to require "reasonable minds to inquire further."'2 51 While such a
burden of persuasion is more easily carried than the applicant's sub-
stantially greater burden of proof in establishing its entitlement to a
permit, it is by no means negligible. 252 An adjudicatory hearing on a
particular issue will be warranted where the intervenor-objectant
247. Oneida County's Energy Recovery Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Con-
serv. Dec. 1 (July 27, 1982) (interim decision) (intervenor-objectant should not have
to definitively decide upon particular expert to substantiate allegations made at
conference, but assertion should arise from opinions offered by qualified witnesses).
248. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 70-0119(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.7(a).
249. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978), quoting Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Portland Cement Corp. v.
Administrator, EPA, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (comments must be significant enough to
step over threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of agency response or
consideration becomes a concern).
250. Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 3 (Nov. 19, 1982) (interim decision) (requisite offer of proof must
indicate specific adverse impacts).
251. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 554 (quoting administrative decision of Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission to the effect that such a burden is not to be equated
with civil litigation concept of a prima facie case). The Supreme Court concluded
that such a standard does not place an unduly heavy substantive burden on interve-
nors-objectants. Id.; accord Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) (to establish substantial environmental
issue, intervenor-objectant must allege facts ignored by agency which, if true, would
constitute significant impact on environment).
252. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553 (intervenor-objectant cannot, for example,
merely point out that a possibly significant effect may result without showing how or
why).
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offers specific and affirmative proof which could result in either per-
mit denials or significant modifications to the proposed action. 25 3
Cross-examination is not available as of right in the issues confer-
ence. 254 The lead agency may permit it, however, where the interve-
nor-objectant is able to make a credible showing that a defect exists in
the application which is likely to affect permit issuance in a substan-
tial way.255
In ruling upon whether the intervenor-objectant has met its burden
of persuasion, the administrative law judge will consider its argu-
ments and offers of proof as well as the application documents and
EnCon's expertise in the matter. 25 The burden of persuasion cannot
be met by merely presenting immaterial and irrelevant testimony 25 7
such as: general opposition to a proposed action,25 8 opposition to the
proposed action on aesthetic and economic grounds, 259 disagreement
with the technical analyses and conclusions independently made by
experts for the applicant and agency staff, 26 0 identification of impor-
tant information without showing its relevance to the ultimate issues
before the decision-makers,2 61 reliance upon scientific articles without
establishing the relevance of the article to environmental or permit
issues,26 2 and disagreement with applicant's preferred alternative
253. See, e.g., Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1. N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2 (Apr. 2, 1982) ("[i]n situations where the Department Staff
have reviewed an application and offer no objection to the issuance of a permit, the
burden of persuasion that substantive and significant issues exist is on the intervening
parties"). See also, N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW. § 70-0119(1) (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983)(determination to convene a public hearing based in part on "reasonable
likelihood that a permit applied for will be denied or can be granted only with major
modifications to the project . . . ").
254. Id; Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 3 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision) (intervenors have right to cross-examine on
those issues in their particular areas of concern which have been identified for
adjudication).
255. Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 2 (Apr. 2, 1982).
256. Id.
257. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(b)(9).
258. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.7(b).
259. Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of Envt'l Con-
serv. Dec. 1 (Apr. 2, 1982); Ecology Action v. Van Cort, 99 Misc.2d 664, 417
N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1979).
260. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2 (Sept.
18, 1981).
261. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 1 (Aug.
27, 1981) (decision on reconvening public hearing).
262. Oneida County's Energy Recovery Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Con-
serv. Dec. 1 (July 27, 1982) (interim decision).
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without producing affirmative evidence to support the viability of
another alternative. 26 3
The consequence of failing to prove the existence of disputed facts
sufficient to induce reasonable minds to inquire further is that the lead
agency will proceed immediately to decision-making. The existence of
substantive and significant issues, however, delays decision-making.
As a practical matter, the applicant wants to accelerate approval,
whereas intervenors-objectants frequently seek to retard the review
process. This is illustrated by two recent EnCon applications. In
Pyramid Crossgates Company,2 64 the Commissioner concluded that he
needed additional information relating to certain mitigation mea-
sures. He invited the applicant to submit further information after the
public adjudicatory hearing 2 5 and stated that he would only recon-
vene the hearing if the submissions raised substantive and significant
issues. 2"6 The submissions did not raise any qualifying issues. Oil
judicial review, intervenors-objectants argued that the decision not to
reconvene the adjudicatory hearing was illegal, arbitrary and capri-
cious and an abuse of discretion because it constituted a mid-review
change of procedure.2 6 7 In dismissing the petition, the court observed
that there could be no basis for disturbing the Commissioner's practi-
cal construction of the regulatory procedures.26 8
In the second application, the applicant sought an EnCon permit
after the lead agency had already issued an FEIS. 269 Over the appli-
cant's objection, the administrative law judge ruled that an alterna-
tive proposed by intervenor-objectant warranted review in an adjudi-
catory hearing. 270 The applicant, supported by agency staff, argued
that it would be improper for EnCon to convene an adjudicatory
hearing to reconsider SEQRA-related issues, although it was conceded
that EnCon was authorized to convene a hearing on permit-related
issues. 271 The applicant further argued that to reconsider such issues
263. See Halfmoon Water Improvement Area, No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of Envt'l
Conserv. Dec. 3 (Apr. 2, 1982).
264. N.Y. State Dep't of Envt' Conserv. Dec. (Nov. 28, 1980).
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id. at 5.
267. See Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Flacke, 89 A.D.2d 759, 453
N.Y.S.2d 939 (3d Dep't 1982), afJ'd 58 N.Y.2d 759, 447 N.E.2d 80, 460 N.Y.S.2d 531
(1983).
268. Id. at 941.
269. Town of Marbletown, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Oct. 21,
1982) (interim decision).
270. Id. at 1.
271. Id.
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would be duplicative and would undermine the integrity of the lead
agency.272 The Commissioner disagreed with these arguments and
held that SEQRA imposes a substantive obligation on EnCon to re-
view even those projects which have been the subject of an FEIS. 273
EnCon is obligated as a matter of law to develop an adjudicatory
record for its decision-making processes where intervenors-objectants
to an EnCon permit hearing raise substantive and significant issues
with respect to alternatives in the FEIS that may represent a less
environmentally damaging alternative while achieving the purpose of
the action. 27 4
Permits will be issued if there are no staff objections and the inter-
venor-objectant is unable to offer sufficient and reasonable proof to
support its contention that the applicant is not entitled to permits. 275
Where, for example, participants raise questions about health prob-
lems associated with the proposed project or activity but are unable to
offer supporting proof of their generalized concerns, the lead agency
must make its decision on the basis of the credible scientific testimony
presented . 27 6
3. Agency Review Procedures
The administrative law judge's decision concerning the necessity of
an adjudicatory hearing is subject to interagency review upon appro-
priate application and submission of argument to the Commis-
sioner. 27 Whether an issue is substantive and significant does not
depend on its characterization by the participants. For example, the
potential impact of a project on traffic depends upon the magnitude of
risk and location of the project and not upon traffic as a subject
matter. 278 In Kozy Hollow Camp Ground-Marina, 2 7 the administra-
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2.
274. Id.
275. See Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 4 (Apr. 2, 1980); Multi-Town Solid Water Management Facility, N.Y.
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 5 (Nov. 19, 1982) (interim decision).
276. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 14, 1983). Referring to health effects from emission of sulfur dioxide (SO,), the
Commissioner stated that the question is the subject of ongoing scientific studies
which have not resulted in definitive thresholds. If and when the scientific commu-
nity reaches a consensus, the existing national air quality standards will likely be
amended and SO, emissions will have to be adjusted accordingly. Id. at 9 n.l.
277. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R, § 624.6(d).
278. See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
18, 1981) (Town of Guilderland, outside the City of Albany; traffic issues referred to
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tive law judge ruled that the disturbance to neighbors created by cars
and trailers would not be a significant issue. 2 0 In contrast, in Pyramid
Crossgates Company,2"' traffic and related considerations for a proj-
ect located in a suburban community and near major arterial road-
ways were critical to approval and therefore subject to the adjudica-
tory process. 22
EnCon does not have to justify denying an adjudicatory hearing. 283
Rather, the intervenor-objectant must demonstrate it is warranted 284
by making an affirmative showing that specific adverse effects are
likely to occur despite technical compliance with the law. 285 In Multi-
Town Solid Waste Management,286 intervenors-objectants challenged
the size of the project by offering to produce named experts to testify
that the proposed facility was overdesigned and would, therefore, be
uneconomical. An adjudicatory hearing appeared to be warranted
under those circumstances, because adverse environmental impacts
had been identified and optimal mitigation measures could still result
in loss of natural resources.2 87 The Commissioner reversed the admin-
istrative law judge and ruled that the facility size issue did warrant
adjudication. 288 The fact that intervenors-objectants failed to allege
non-compliance with permit criteria was not dispositive on the issue of
Department of Transportation for resolution); H.O.M.E.S. v. Urban Develop.
Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1979) (downtown Syracuse;
parking and traffic issues).
279. Kozy Hollow Campground-Marina, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Dec. 13, 1982).
280. Id. The project was located in Port Bay, Lake Ontario, Wayne County, New
York.
281. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2-4 (June
25, 1981).
282. Id; see also Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec
3 (Nov. 28, 1980) ("[w]hile it has been demonstrated that many of the impacts ...
can be mitigated . . . air quality and traffic" have not).
283. Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198, 212 (1980) (burden of
demonstrating that case presents disputed issues of material fact is on party challeng-
ing agency's decision).
284. Id.
285. Kozy Hollow Campground-Marina, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 2-3 (Dec. 13, 1982) (interim decision).
286. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Nov. 19, 1982).
287. Id. Although intervenor-objectant identified a number of project alterna-
tives, it proffered proof of only one. On interagency appeal, the Commissioner
affirmed the administrative law judge in limiting the suggested alternatives to the
one for which proof was offered. Id. at 3.
288. Id. at 4-5.
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compliance, 289 since that determination rests exclusively with the lead
agency. 290
C. The Adjudicatory Hearing
The applicant for permits from EnCon is entitled to an adjudica-
tory hearing where issues have been raised which, if unresolved, may
result in permit denial or the imposition of significant permit condi-
tions. 291 To satisfy its burden of proof that it is entitled to the re-
quested permits, the applicant must support its position with appro-
priate expert opinion, scientific authorities, empirical or experimental
data and explanatory material. 29 2 The hearing is intended to satisfy
due process requirements 293 and not as a forum for the adjudication of
289. Id. at 5.
290. Cf.: Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 3 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision) (under its statutory obligations, EnCon
"cannot and will not turn over these ultimate regulatory responsibilities to an inter-
venor, and must proceed to make its own decisions on the basis of the record as a
whole and as supported by substantial evidence").
291. Id. The Commissioner has stated that EnCon must conduct an adjudicatory
hearing under such circumstances in accordance with § 70-0119 of the Environmen-
tal Conservation Law and the State Administrative Procedure Act, articles 3 and 4.
Id. at 2.
292. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973); [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 624.11(f) (proof must be by preponderance of the evidence). See also Pyramid
Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Nov. 28, 1980) (abso-
lutely necessary for applicant to submit concise and technically acceptable evidence).
293. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 3 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision) (adjudicatory hearing procedure is necessary
because it is applicant who is primarily affected by prospect of permit denial or
imposition of significant permit conditions); see Buttrey v. United States Corps of
Engineers, 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2087 (1983)-
(applicant applied for permit from Army Corps of Engineers under 404(a) of Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(a)(1976)). The Corps denied the application at the initial
scoping stage. The applicant argued that he was denied his constitutional and statu-
tory rights because the Corps refused to grant him an adjudicatory hearing and that
the administrative record was incomplete. The court held that the 404 permit did not
require such a hearing. Where the decision is discretionary with the agency "absent
fairly unusual circumstances . . . the Corps should not be required . . . to grant
requests for trial-type hearings." Buttrey, 690 F.2d at 1178. This analysis, however,
was not intended to answer the issue of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. See
also Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973). If the administrative record is truly incomplete, not because of the failure to
convene a trial-type hearing but because there has been insufficient input on an issue
which if unresolved could lead to permit denial, the matter should be remanded for
further consideration, but not necessarily for an adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 835. See
also [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.5 (rights of parties). Section 624.5(b) provides that a
party to an adjudicatory hearing shall have the right to present relevant written and
oral argument on issues of law and fact, to present relevant evidence and to cross-
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rights between the applicant and intervenor-objectant.1 4 The deci-
sion to convene an adjudicatory hearing is neither a prejudgment of
the outcome of the review process nor a punishment of the applicant
for filing the permit request. 29 5 The purpose of the adjudicatory hear-
ing is to ensure that the applicant has a "clear picture of what its
burden is so that the ultimate decision is environmentally sound, fair
and legally defensible."29 6 The scope of the adjudicatory hearing is
limited to the resolution of the substantive and significant issues iden-
tified in the issues conference. 29
7
The applicant's burden of proof does not relieve the intervenor-
objectant from demonstrating that the existence of facts which it
raised in the issues conference actually warrants permit denial or
project modification by incorporating conditions to any permit ap-
proval. 29 8 Thus, while the Uniform Procedure Act requires convening
a public hearing to resolve substantial and significant issues, it is still
"incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure
their participation so that it is meaningful, [and] so that it alerts the
agency to the intervenor's positions and contentions." ' 29
D. Substantial Evidence
The EnCon regulations require the lead agency to make its decision
on the basis of the record as a whole and supported by substantial
examine witnesses of other parties. See also Izaak Walton League of America v.
Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 (D.C. Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 657 (1982). In
Izaak Walton, the court held that a party does not have a constitutional right to an
adjudicatory hearing because the protections of the Due Process Clause are extended
only when a 'property' or 'liberty' interest has been threatened, and that generalized
environmental concerns do not constitute a property or liberty interest. Id. at 361.
294. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
5 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision).
295. Town of Marbletown, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Oct. 21,
1982) (interim decision).
296. Id.
297. Oneida County's Energy Recovery Facility, Rulings of the Administrative
Law Judge, 1 (July 7, 1982).
298. See Costle v. Pacific Legal Fund, 445 U.S. 198, 214 (1980) (party seeking a
hearing required to meet threshold burden of tendering evidence suggesting need for
such hearing). Having raised a triable issue, the party must offer specific evidence to
support its position. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
598 F.2d 1221 (1st Cir. 1979). See also [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(a)(6) (evidence
will be confined to that which is relevant to the issues); Id. § 624.7(b)(9) (irrelevant,
unduly repetitious, tangential or speculative testimony or argument will be pre-
cluded).
299. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978).
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evidence. 300 The record is the totality of evidence offered by all of the
participants. 30 1 In satisfying its burden of proof, applicant has no
obligation to convince any intervenor-objectant of its entitlement to
permits, 30 2 nor must it demonstrate such entitlement on the basis of its
proof alone. 30 3 The applicant is entitled to the issuance of permits
where, based on the totality of the evidence and regardless of the
source of proof, the proposed project or activity is or can be made
environmentally sound .304
IV. The Decision-Making Process
A. Statutory/Regulatory Requirements
Decision-making on environmental issues in connection with the
proposed project or activity is vested exclusively in the lead agency. 30 5
Involved agencies may act only after the lead agency has made an
affirmative finding. 306 In addition, only a permit-issuing agency may
act as a lead agency. 30 7 This section will introduce the basic proce-
dural requirements for lead agency decision-making and the statu-
tory/regulatory commands of SEQRA which impose on the lead
agency a duty to approve only projects which are environmentally
sound. The opening sections review the requirements for the lead
agency to file an adequate FEIS, make affirmative findings and un-
dertake a balancing analysis of environmental, social and economic
considerations. The closing sections examine the ways in which the
lead agency exercises its statutory authority.
300. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.15(b).
301. The N.Y. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE Pnoc. ACT § 306 (McKinney Pamphlet 1982)
requires all decisions and determinations to be made upon consideration of the record
as a whole and "as supported by and in accordance with substantial evidence." See 5
B. Mezines, J. Stein, & J. Gruff, Administrative Law § 51.02 (1983).
302. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
3 (Oct. 7, 1981).
303. Id. at 7.
304. Id. See also Consolidated Edison Co., Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983) (project approved, but not in form proposed).
305. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0111(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.6(d) (designation of lead agency); id. § 617.9 (decision-
making and finding requirements).
306. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(a).
307. See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Board of Albany, 96 A.D.2d
986, 988, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (3d Dep't 1983); Glen Head-Glenwood Civic
Council, Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 109 Misc.2d 376, 438 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1981), aff'd, 88 A.D.2d 484, 492-93, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732, 738 (2d Dep't
1982).
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1. Explicit Findings that the Requirements of SEQRA Have Been Met
At the conclusion of the environmental review/permit request proc-
ess the lead agency must decide whether the proposed project or
activity is environmentally sound. 30 8 If the lead agency determines
that the proposed project or activity is unsound as proposed, the lead
agency may either deny the permits requested by the applicant 3 9 or
disapprove the applicant's preferences. 31 0 Where the lead agency ap-
proves the applicant's project or activity it must make explicit findings
that the requirements of SEQRA have been met. 31 Its finding must
state that the adverse environmental effects revealed during the re-
view will be minimized or avoided to the maximum extent practica-
ble. 31 2 Moreover, this result must be attained by utilizing reasonable
alternatives and be consistent with economic and social consider-
308. See Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. 7 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision) ("[t]he primary function of the environmen-
tal review process under SEQRA is to fashion environmentally sound projects
through public participation").
309. Although not specifically authorized by SEQRA, an aggrieved participant in
the environmental review process has the right to challenge the lead agency decision
by judicial review under CPLR Article 78. Dairylea Coop. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6,
10, 339 N.E.2d 865, 868, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (1975) (fundamental tenet of our
system of remedies is that when government agency seeks to act in manner adversely
affecting a party, judicial review of that action may be had).
310. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(Sept. 14, 1983).
311. N.Y. ENVTL. CONsa av. LAW § 8-0109(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
[1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2).
312. Id. The applicant cannot avoid SEQRA by proposing a project or activity
which will be constructed in stages, in which any one stage may have no significant
effect on the environment, but cumulatively the effect will be consequential. See
Kozy Hollow Campground-Marina, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2 (July
18, 1983) (cumulative impacts of proposed action must be addressed in record in
order to reach informed decision on whether or not project should be approved);
Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Board of Albany, 96 A.D.2d 986, 466 N.Y.S.2d
828 (3d Dep't 1983) (failed to address the cumulative impacts). In Save the Pine
Bush, the "lead agency" issued a negative declaration and the decision maker ap-
proved the project even though the project met Type I requirements in the following
ways: it was substantially a 250-unit residential development (the application was for
248 units) ([1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.12 [b][5][iii]); was substantially contiguous to
a publicly designated open space and exceeded the 25% threshold ([1978] 6
N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.12[b][10]); was part of a multiphase project with cumulative
impacts ([1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.11[a][11],[b][1]); and was one of several sepa-
rate projects with cumulative impacts ([1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.11[a][11], [b][1]).
Id. at 987, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 831. See also Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc. v. Flacke,
81 A.D.2d 1022, 440 N.Y.S.2d 788 (4th Dep't 1981) (in issuing positive declaration,
EnCon properly took into account potential effect of proposed subdivision as part of
its consideration of environmental impact of mining operation).
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ations. 313 If necessary, it may achieve SEQRA's goals by "incorporat-
ing as conditions ... those mitigative measures" identified as practi-
cable during the review process. 31 4 Although the statutory language
may sound ritualistic, it imposes on the lead agency the affirmative
duty to ensure that the project is environmentally sound.3 15 The lead
agency has the authority to discharge its duty in one of several
ways: 3"1 applications for permits may be denied or granted, 3 7 granted
in part 31 8 or granted with significant conditions. 31 9 There is no statu-
tory requirement that the lead agency approve the action in the
proposed form. 320 Further, the courts have not been hospitable to lead
agency decisions based on incomplete knowledge of environmental
risks321 or scientifically suspect analysis of likely impacts. 322 Even
313. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2).
314. Id.§ 617.9(c)(2)(ii).
315. See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc., 96 A.D.2d 986, 987, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828,
831 (court has set standard to prevent SEQRA from becoming one more step in
"bureaucratic maze" wherein fundamental impact requirements are circumvented).
316. See Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215,
430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980). The policies and goals of SEQRA are achieved by
the imposition of both procedural and substantive requirements upon agency deci-
sion-making. Id. at 220, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 445. The law does not require "particular
substantive results in particular problematic instances". Id. at 222, 430 N.Y.S.2d
447.
317. See infra notes 389-92 and accompanying text. See also Power Authority of
New York v. Flacke, 94 A.D.2d 69, 464 N.Y.S.2d 252 (3d Dep't), rev'd, N.Y.L.J.
Dec. 8, 1983, at 24, col. 5 (Commissioner's denial of certification for proposed hydro-
electric plant, based solely on water quality standards affirmed; did not need to
consider social or economic factors or need for new power plants).
318. See in ra notes 405-20 and accompanying text.
319. See infra notes 421-32 and accompanying text. The authority of the lead
agency to impose permit conditions which meet the test of reasonableness was
established in Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215,
430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
320. Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
14, 1983). The Commissioner approved the applicant's request to convert two plants
to coal burning, however, in a manner different from that proposed in the applica-
tion. Id. at 18. Moreover, the approvals were conditioned upon the applicant identi-
fying a landfill facility for disposal of solid wastes. Id. at 15.
321. See, e.g., Centre Square Ass'n v. Corning, 105 Misc.2d 6, 430 N.Y.S.2d 953
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980) (although lead agency had no evidence to support its
determination, it issued a negative declaration relying only upon applicant's submis-
sion and ignored public input).
322. See, e.g., Action for Rational Transit v. Westside Highway Project, 536 F.
Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Action for Rational Transit involved the "Westway"
project in Manhattan, which was intended to replace the southern portion of the
deteriorating Westside Highway. A biological survey prepared in connection with
the DEIS initially concluded that the inter-pier area was a "biological wasteland"
and that the project would have no impact on fisheries in the Hudson River. A
subsequent study reached the conclusion that the inter-pier area was a highly signifi-
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though the courts may not second-guess an agency decision supported
by substantial evidence, 323 they have insisted that lead agencies com-
ply literally with the procedural requirements of SEQRA. 324 As a
result, lead agency decisions have been set aside even where there was
some evidence of substantial compliance. 32 5 The lead agency acts not
cant and productive habitat for fish, including striped bass. The Army Corps of
Engineers suppressed the study and approved the requested permit. The district court
made the following observations:
The Corps had no right to swallow up these issues in the privacy of its
bosom. It was required to make fair and open disclosure not only of the
available facts, but of the responsible scientific views as to the risks in-
volved in the loss of this habitat.
Id. 536 F. Supp. at 1253.
323. The role of a court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's consideration
of environmental factors, however, is limited to determining whether the agency has
complied with its substantive obligations. Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free
School Dist. No. 1, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974) (courts
cannot interfere with agency's decision unless decision has no rational basis). See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1970); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (responsible decision-making does not mean decisions reviewing
court would necessarily have made). See also Izaak Walton League of America v.
Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 657 (1982)
(courts must ensure that agency's conclusions are not irrational or otherwise arbitrary
and capricious); Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 415 F. Supp. 1298, 1303
(D. Ariz. 1976) (judiciary's principle role is to insure compliance with required
methodology, not to provide forum for expression of substantive disagreements aris-
ing from utilization of that methodology).
324. Glen Head-Glenwood Civic Council v. Town of Oyster Bay, 109 Misc.2d
376, 438 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981), aJJ'd, 88 A.D.2d 484, 453
N.Y.S.2d 732 (2d Dep't 1982) (rezoning for highest density residential use granted on
erroneous assumption that neighboring community had approved use of its sewage
treatment plant by proposed condominium project). The court stated:
[I]t is apparent that the outside public agencies involved relied heavily on
the assurance in the impact statement that a sewer hook-up commitment
had been received from Glen Cove. It is equally obvious that review of the
alternative sewage disposal plans by other agencies was muted because of
the desirability of the Glen Cove hook-up. We agree, then, with Special
Term's conclusion that as a result of this failure to communicate the vital
issue of the sewage was passed over as having been fully satisfied and the
attention of the concerned agencies [was] diverted elsewhere.
Id. at 495, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 739 (citations omitted); see also H.O.M.E.S., 69 A.D.2d
at 232, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (applicant omitted discussion of parking and traffic
flow).
325. Matter of Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442
N.Y.S.2d 67 (2d Dep't 1981). In Rye Town, the lead agency issued a negative
declaration, although the project met the statutory criteria for a Type I action. The
court held that agencies must comply with both the letter and spirit of SEQRA before
they will be found to have discharged their responsibilities. Id. at 480-81, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 71. See also Schenectady Chemicals v. Flacke, 83 A.D.2d 460, 463, 446
N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (3d Dep't 1981) (substance of SEQRA cannot be achieved without
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only for itself; it also has the special responsibility of overseeing the
adequate identification of impacts and development of associated
mitigation through the EIS process for the benefit of all other decision
makers. 326
If the applicant's proposal meets the requirements of SEQRA, it is
entitled to an affirmative finding by the lead agency. 327 The mere fact
that the proposed action is controversial is not sufficient grounds for
disapproval. 328 If, on the other hand, the lead agency finds that the
applicant has not met the SEQRA requirements, the applicant is not
entitled to permits for the proposed action from any agency. 329 The
applicant is, however, entitled to know the shortcomings of its appli-
cation. 330 If the lead agency makes an affirmative finding, it must also
its procedure; therefore, attempts by agencies to vary procedural prerequisities are
not permitted since such deviations undermine the law's express purposes); Glen
Head-Glenwood Civic Council v. Town of Oyster Bay, 88 A.D.2d 484, 490-91, 453
N.Y.S.2d 732, 737 (SEQRA requires literal compliance; substantial compliance will
not do); cf. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc.2d 640, 449 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1982) (court vacated EnCon's decision granting requested variance because
application was incomplete).
After the fact compliance with the requirements of SEQRA will not cure an initial
failure to comply. Tri-County Taxpayers Assoc., Inc. v. Town Board of Queensbury,
55 N.Y.2d 41, 46, 432 N.E.2d 592, 594, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (1982); Webster
Assocs. v. Webster, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 228, 451 N.E.2d 189, 192, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434
(1983) (omission of required item from DEIS cannot be cured by simply including
item in FEIS).
326. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (June
25, 1981).
327. See, e.g., Ass'n for the Dev. of a Healthy Oneonta Community, Inc. v.
Kirkpatrick, 87 A.D.2d 934, 450 N.Y.S.2d 78 (3d Dep't 1982) (reasonable determina-
tion made in accordance with regulatory criteria); Town of Poughkeepsie v. Flack,
105 Misc.2d 149, 431 N.Y.S.2d 951, (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1980), alf'd, 84
A.D.2d 1, 445 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1981) (EnCon's issuance of permit does not
relieve applicant from local zoning requirements); Heritage Hills Waterworks Corp.,
N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec., Report by administrative law judge (Jan.
28, 1980). In Heritage Hills, the administrative law judge concluded that the modifi-
cations and conditions will ensure that the applicant's plans will provide the proper
and safe construction of all work, proper protection of the supply and watershed
from contamination and the proper treatment of such additional water supplies as
may be required. Id, at 10.
328. See Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 633
F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1980); Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Town of
Guilderland, 91 A.D.2d 763, 458 N.Y.S.2d 13 (3d Dep't 1982); Concerned Citizens
Against Crossgates v. Flacke, 89 A.D.2d 759, 760, 453 N.Y.S.2d 939, 941 (3d Dep't
1982), aJJ'd, 58 N.Y.2d 919, 447 N.E.2d 80, 460 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1983).
329. [1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(a) (no agency shall approve an action until it is
shown to comply with SEQRA).
330. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 4 (Nov.
28, 1980). The Commissioner noted that in view of the depth, breadth and duration
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address the corollary issue of permits. 33' Where the affirmative find-
ing can only be made by modifying the project either through the
imposition of significant conditions or by approving alternatives to the
applicant's preference, the lead agency must specifically state its rea-
sons for imposing the conditions or approving alternatives. 332
2. The Final Environmental Impact Statement
To be adequate and sufficient, the FEIS must contain an appropri-
ately detailed review of the relevant and material facts developed
during the review process. 333 The FEIS is used by the lead agency
initially, and thereafter by each involved agency, as a basis for fulfill-
ing its statutory decision-making obligations.3 34 Although the FEIS
need not be prepared by the lead agency, it is always prepared for the
lead agency. 335 If it is prepared under contract or by the applicant,
both the form and adequacy of the submission must be approved by
the lead agency before it is acceptable for filing. 336 An EnCon FEIS
includes the hearing report prepared by the administrative law judge.
The hearing report summarizes the positions of each participant and
of the hearing in this case, the applicant was entitled to the "most specific identifica-
tion of shortcomings." Id.
331. See infra notes 389-92 and accompanying text for discussion of permit issu-
ance.
332. See Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440; Pyramid Crossga-
tes Company, N.Y. State Dep't of Envt'l. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Sept. 18, 1981) (permits
stayed until the Department of Transportation determined final roadway design and
made its own correlative affirmative SEQRA findings); Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam
Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2 (May 18, 1982) (to avoid any
contamination of potable water, one permit condition was to relocate water mains
located beneath site of proposed structure to new position outside perimeter of
structure, if requested to do so by state or local authorities); Consolidated Edison
Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 11 (Sept. 14, 1983) (applicant's
proposal to burn 1 % sulfur coal without flue gas desulfurization equipment rejected
because "when viewed on the basis of this record, it will not sufficiently minimize or
avoid the adverse environmental effects revealed in the FEIS").
333. See, e.g., Action for Rational Transit v. Westside Highway Project, 536 F.
Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
334. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(a)(no agency may issue decision on proposed
action until FEIS has been filed); id. § 617.9(c)(1)(no agency shall make final
decision until it has given consideration to FEIS).
335. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV, LAW §§ 8-0109(2), 8-0111(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983). The FEIS can be prepared for the agency by "contract or otherwise." Id. § 8-
0109(2).
336. See [1978] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.8(b) (before accepting DEIS, lead agency
must determine whether it is satisfactory with respect to its scope, content and
adequacy).
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makes findings of fact and conclusions based on the record.3 37 Alterna-
tively, the FEIS may also be an assembly of the DEIS, suitably revised
to include any other reasonable alternatives and mitigation measures
developed during the course of the review, together with summaries
of significant comments by intervenors-objectants and responses by
the applicant and lead agency. 338
Whether the author is a lead agency, a contractor or the applicant,
the FEIS must address the environmental concerns of intervenors-
objectants, identify essential issues raised by participants and evaluate
reasonable alternatives. 339 An FEIS must consider the proposed alter-
natives and mitigation measures and evaluate their comparative mer-
its in a coherent and understandable presentation. 340 It will be defi-
cient if it omits significant information developed during the course of
the review. 341 A deficient FEIS cannot be made adequate by showing
that the information relied upon by the lead agency is in the record.3 42
Since the FEIS is intended to serve other decision-makers, it must
provide them with sufficient discussion and analysis of the environ-
mental effects of both the proposed action and alternatives to assist
their decision-making processes. 343
The FEIS has been called the "teeth" of SEQRA.1 44 While it nomi-
nally serves an educational purpose 345 and is intended to be a reposi-
tory of information 3 4 it is more than a mere disclosure document.3 47
337. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.7(d) (where EnCon is lead agency, DEIS and
ALJ's report shall constitute FEIS).
338. Id. § 617.14(h).
339. Id. § 617.14(f).
340. Id. § 617.14(c).
341. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92-94
(2d Cir. 1975) (conclusory statements are generally inadequate for decision-making
purposes).
342. Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072-74 (1st Cir.
1980).
343. Id. at 1073-74.
344. See Bliek v. Town of Webster, 104 Misc.2d 852, 864, 429 N.Y.S.2d 811, 820
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1980).
345. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974) (EIS is
in compliance with NEPA when its form, content and preparation provide decision-
makers with disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid in substantive decision whether to
proceed with action in light of its environmental consequences); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972) (EIS should be suffi-
ciently detailed to enable those who did not have a part in its preparation to critically
evaluate agency's process of decision-making).
346. See [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.14(f).
347. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 220-
21, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445-46 (4th Dep't 1980).
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The court's insistence that SEQRA mandates literal compliance em-
phasizes that both the DEIS and the FEIS are regarded as action-
forcing devices. 348 It fulfills its substantive purpose by focusing atten-
tion on the benefits and burdens of the proposed action, its
environmental impacts and the mitigation measures that will be in-
corporated into the applicant's final design for project approval.3 49
An involved agency is not authorized to approve a proposed action
until it has considered the FEIS. 350 Moreover, neither the lead agency
nor an involved agency may approve an application for a permit
outside its jurisdiction. 351 On the other hand, an involved agency may
review the application or undertake feasibility studies during the
review process to determine whether the applicant has or can comply
with technical requirements, provided that such action does not com-
mit the involved agency to approval. 52
3. The Balancing Analysis
The lead agency must give appropriate weight to both environmen-
tal and nonenvironmental values in reaching its decision. 353 The En-
Con regulations require the lead agency to make its decision based on
a "suitable balance of social, economic and environmental factors."3 54
348. Id. at 221, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 445; accord Council on Environmental Quality
regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)(1982).
349. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2)(i), (ii).
350. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(1).
351. Webster Assocs. v. Webster, 85 A.D.2d 882, 446 N.Y.S.2d 955 (4th Dep't
1981), rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 451 N.E.2d 189, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983). The Court of
Appeals found that the lead agency's action was taken in violation of the town's
zoning ordinance. The Planning Board had already disapproved the application and
that determination foreclosed further consideration of the proposal by the Town
Board. See also Town of Poughkeepsie v. Flacke, 105 Misc.2d 149, 431 N.Y.S.2d 951
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1980), affd, 84 A.D.2d 1, 445 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't
1981). The Town of Poughkeepsie contended that the Commissioner had exceeded
his jurisdiction, because EnCon issued permits for a solid waste management facility
with knowledge that the Town's zoning was incompatible with such a facility. In his
decision, however, the Commissioner emphasized that SEQRA authorized him to
issue permits where the applicant demonstrated compliance with the law. He stated
that he was not adjudicating the legality of a proposed use under laws not adminis-
tered by EnCon, and concluded that his decision did not preempt the Town from
enforcing its local zoning ordinance when it received the application. Id. at 5, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 235.
352. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(c).
353. N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsmv. LAW § 8-0103(7) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
354. [1983] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.1(d). Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 8 (June 25, 1981) (relevancy of socio-economic factors increases
proportionate to the 8tegree of adverse environmental impacts involved). Cf. 40
C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1982) (Counsel on Environmental Quality regulations provide
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Furthermore, the EnCon regulations emphasize that environmental
factors are not intended to be the sole consideration. 355 One court has
stated that SEQRA requires a "rather finely tuned and systematic
balancing analysis in every instance." 35 6 These interpretations of
SEQRA, however, do not mean that consideration of social and eco-
nomic values can result in the disapproval of a proposed action which
is found to be environmentally sound. 35 7 Conversely, the applicant
may not achieve approval by promoting possible public benefits while
ignoring their environmental costs. 358 To balance environmental and
nonenvironmental values, a sound pragmatic rule is that the more
valuable the affected environmental resources, or the greater the
potential adverse environmental effect of the proposed project or
activity, the more the lead agency must scrutinize the social and
economic factors.3 59
A decision based on a record with conflicting testimony does not
inherently warrant denial of the permit or modification of the proj-
ect. 36° Scientists and experts may, and do, disagree in their analyses
and conclusions.3 61 Moreover, although the concept may be contradic-
tory when measured against the requirements in a plenary trial,362 the
applicant's statutory burden of proof in the review process does not
that "economic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require preparation
of an environmental impact statement").
355. [1983] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.1(d).
356. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d at 223, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
357. See infra notes 374-81 and accompanying text for discussion of cultural
values.
358. Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Flacke, 94 A.D.2d 69, 464 N.Y.S.2d 252 (3d Dep't),
rev'd, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 8, 1983, p. 24, col. 5, p. 25, col. 3 (Commissioner's concern is
limited to compliance with water quality standards; he has "neither authority nor
responsibility to engage in balancing economic, energy, environmental or other
factors or to reflect public interest"); see also Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979
(5th Cir. 1983).
359. Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 4 (Nov. 19, 1982); Miracle Mile Associates, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 2 (Dec. 6, 1979).
360. See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2
(Sept. 18, 1981) (existence of methodologies as to which reasonable men could
interminably differ does not warrant denying application).
361. See Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973) (disagree-
ment among experts will not serve to invalidate an EIS); Rella v. Berle, 59 A.D.2d
56, 60, 397 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (3d Dep't 1977) (while there was conflict of expert
opinion on contested issue, there was substantial evidence in record to support
administrative determination that, subject to conditions imposed, proposed project
would not have adverse effect feared).
362. See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text for discussion of proof require-
ments.
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require it to establish entitlement to the requested permits on its own
evidence alone. 3 63
a. Land Use Considerations
The lead agency may not assume burdens properly within the
jurisdiction of other agencies. 364 For example, EnCon cannot mediate
land use issues raised by local interest groups 36 5 or interfere with the
determination of water districts. 66 Decisions concerning non-environ-
mental factors which are local in nature, including zoning configura-
tions and long-term municipal planning, must be made in the com-
munity affected by the proposed project or activity. 36 7 Where the
applicant proves the proposed action complies with local zoning,
however, and shows that the proposed action even represents a land
use within the existing zoning category that is potentially far less
damaging to the environment than other permitted uses, it is entitled
363. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
3 (Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision). The applicant has no obligation to convince its
critics that it is entitled to the issuance of permits. Moreover, the legislature entrusted
to the lead agency the responsibility for determining whether an applicant is entitled
to a permit. Id. at 3. The law also prohibits the lead agency from delegating its
responsibility. See, e.g., Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council, Inc. v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 88 A.D.2d 484, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732 (2d Dep't 1982) (responsibility for
SEQRA determination was improperly delegated to non-permit issuing agency espe-
cially established for that purpose). In Glen Head, the Court held that the -'delega-
tion of lead agency decision-making obligations is inconsistent with the SEQRA
review and consideration functions." Id. at 492, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 738. See also Kleist
v. City of Glendale, 56 Cal. App.3d 770, 128 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1976). The court of
appeals rejected the Glendale City Counsel's delegation of duties to its Environmen-
tal and Planning Board on the ground that it "insulates the members of the council
from public awareness and possible reaction to the individual members' environmen-
tal and economic values." Id. at 779, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
364. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(b). See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 25, 1981) (final decision). The Commissioner
stated that, -[w]hile it is true that SEQRA mandates agencies to avoid or minimize
adverse environmental impacts before approving a project, efficiency in government
mandates that agencies must recognize jurisdictional claims and defer to a specific
jurisdictional claim of another agency." Id. at 3.
365. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 8 (June
25, 1981) (it is not EnCon's role to mediate local land issues).
366. Halfmoon Water Improvement Area No. 1, N.Y. State Dep't. of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 3 (Apr. 2, 1982).
367. Miracle Mile Assocs., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Dec. 6,
1979) (EnCon will not "intrude its judgment ...in matters which have properly
been the subject of definitive local government determinations of patterns of land use
through comprehensive planning and resulting in implementation of local develop-
ment goals").
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to an affirmative SEQRA determination by the lead agency absent
proof of environmental damage.36 8
b. Economic Values
There are two aspects to economic values: first, the issue of eco-
nomic injury, and second, the issue of cost. As to the former, SEQRA
is not intended to protect persons from economic injury due to compe-
tition. 369 The effect of competition is not within the legitimate scope of
inquiry in an adjudicatory proceeding, even though the proposed
activity may have a foreseeably detrimental economic impact. 370 The
368. See Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Town of Guilderland Zoning
Board of Appeals, 91 A.D.2d 763, 458 N.Y.S.2d 13 (3d Dep't 1982); Preservation
Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (where federal project
conforms to existing land use patterns, zoning or local plans, such conformity is
evidence supporting finding of no significant impact).
369. See New York State Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 98 Misc.2d 1045, 1050, 414
N.Y.S.2d 956, 959 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1979) (economic injury is not within
zone of interests and cannot serve as basis for standing under SEQRA); Miracle Mile
Assocs., N.Y. State Dept. of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Dec. 6, 1979). See also Nat'l
Assoc. of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1976). The
Rumsfeld court noted:
Plaintiffs attack these conclusions arguing that the assessments should have
and did not include considerations of socio-economic factors. Plaintiffs'
primary concerns are economic; to wit, the increased unemployment in
the Pueblo, Colorado area as a result of job losses . . . and the resultant
negative effect on the economy as a whole in the community.
Such considerations, however, are not the primary concern of NEPA.
The primary concern is the physical environmental resources of the na-
tion.
Id. at 1229 (emphasis added). In Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility,
N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 4 (Nov. 19, 1982), the Commissioner noted:
"Economic considerations, such as cost, become a relevant factor in the decision-
making process where optimum mitigation of environmental impacts still results in
the loss of natural resources." Moreover, it "is at this point that social and/or
economic considerations must be balanced against this degradation of the environ-
ment in order to fulfill the informed decision-making required by the SEQRA." Id.
See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 5 (Sept. 18,
1981) (phased opening of the mall can work to benefit of existing retail operations by
giving them time to observe and adjust their marketing strategies to offset economic
impact of new facility).
370. City of Plattsburgh v. Mannix, Unrptd. Dec. (Sup. Ct. Clinton County
1979), afJ'd on other grounds, 77 A.D.2d 114, 432 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dep't 1980). In
rejecting the objectant's argument, the lower court observed that its decision is
"painful because it is believed that most people fear urban decay more than they do
the loss of an endangered species of wildlife." Id. at 8. The court continued, "our
nation has prospered under a free enterprise, competitive system. That system would
become completely impotent if a building permit were to be denied upon the basis
that the applicant's competitors might sustain an economic reversal or a particular
geographical area might become less popular." Id. See also City of Kingston v. Town
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lead agency is not authorized to "intrude its judgment in matters
which involve open competition in the free enterprise system of [the
state's] economy."' 37' On the other hand, where there are unaccepta-
ble environmental risks, promises of significant social and economic
benefits will not result in a project's approval in the absence of practi-
cable mitigation measures. 372 Cost considerations only become a rele-
vant factor in the decision-making process where optimum mitigation
of environmental impacts would still result in the loss of natural
resources. 
373
c. Cultural, Neighborhood and Community Values
Unless the threat to cultural values directly impacts on the physical
environment, it will not be a basis for denial of a permit. 374 Such a
rule is based on sound reasons. First, physical effects on the environ-
ment are more readily ascertainable and definable than cultural val-
ues. 375 Second, quality of life considerations are often too complex and
of Ulster, Unrptd. Dec. (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1980) (economic injury due to
competition not protected under SEQRA). The Kingston Court summarized petition-
er's argument as follows:
Petitioner's prime argument is that economic injury does give rise to
standing, relying upon the direction in the Environmental Quality Review
Act that 'social, economic, and environmental factors shall be considered
together in reaching decisions on proposed activities'. . . . The fact that a
reviewing agency or public corporation is to consider economic concerns
in reaching a determination does not confer standing upon a municipal
corporation whose only contact with the proposed project, and environ-
mental review thereof, is economic competition.
Id. at 6.
371. Miracle Mile Assocs., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Dec. 6,
1979).
372. See, e.g., Bio-Tech Mills, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't. of Envtl. Conserv., Rulings
of the Administrative Law Judge 3 (Nov. 15, 1982) (loss of employment if plant has
to close to comply with permit conditions).
373. Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 4 (Nov. 19, 1982).
374. Compare Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982)
(permit to rehabilitate historic building granted) with Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns
v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378, 388 (2d Cir. 1975) (postal service
enjoined from entering into contract for construction of vehicle maintenance facility
for failure of EIS to consider neighborhood and community factors).
375. See Metropolitan Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 75 L.Ed.2d 534
(1983) (psychological health only cognizable under NEPA where there is closeness of
relationship between change in environment and effect at issue); Breckinridge v.
Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864, 866 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977)
(non-environmental factors are to be considered only when there exists primary
impact on physical environment; court found no such impact).
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subtle for SEQRA's decision-making processes.3 76 In a conflict be-
tween cultural values and economic growth, therefore, the decision
maker is not required to decide in favor of cultural values or favor
historic preservation over commercial development. 377 Property listed
on the National Register of Historic Places is not ipso facto protected,
although it is entitled to greater consideration than unlisted prop-
erty. 378 An unlisted property, on the other hand, cannot, in itself,
affect the issuance of a permit.
3 79
Where the conflict is between the staging or creation of an artistic
or cultural event and preservation of natural resources, the applicant
must demonstrate that the proposal will not result in any substantial
adverse effect on the environment. 380 Even the risk of such an altera-
tion will result in denial of a permit or approval.
381
d. Public Need
Although public need is one factor the lead agency must consider,
in practice, its importance for a private action diminishes in propor-
tion to the applicant's proof of avoidance or mitigation of adverse
impacts. 382 In the absence of adverse environmental impacts, need
carries little weight. 383 Where adverse environmental impacts have
376. See Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. City and
County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 913, 165 Cal. Rptr. 401, 412 (1980)
(demolishing historical landmark for new retail facility).
377. Id.
378. Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 278-
82 (3d Cir. 1983).
379. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. City of New York, 672 F.2d
292, 299 (2d Cir. 1982) (demolition of unlisted Broadway theatres).
380. See, e.g., Running Fence Corp. v. Superior Ct., County of Sonoma, 51 Cal.
App. 3d 400, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1975) (artist's fabric fence stretching along Califor-
nia coastline).
381. See Christo, N.Y. City Dep't of Parks Dec. (Feb. 1981) (application to
construct 108 miles of steel "gates" in Central Park denied because, for among other
reasons, there would be risk of permanent alteration).
382. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
6 (May 18, 1982); Multi-Town Solid Waste Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't
of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Nov. 19, 1982). In Multi-Town, the Commissioner held
that the issue of need is more likely to rise to a level of importance where adverse
environmental affects have been identified. In that event, a showing of need for the
purpose of balancing considerations must go beyond private financial endeavors and
demonstrate the filling of a void to the betterment of the general public. Id. at 5. See
supra note' 358 (even where there is demonstrable public need, unless applicant can
demonstrate compliance with environmental standards, denial of permit is war-
ranted).
383. Multi-Town Solid Waste:Management Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv. Dec. 5 (Nov. 19, 1982).
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been identified which cannot be adequately mitigated, however, the
applicant must be able to demonstrate unequivocal benefits to the
general public above and beyond the usual benefits of increased em-
ployment opportunities and expansion of the sales and real estate tax
base184 before it is entitled to the issuance of a permit. 38 5
The applicant's failure to show public need, however, is not a basis
for denying a permit where it complies with SEQRA requirements. 38 6
Rarely will a privately sponsored project satisfy public need 38 7 even
though local decision makers may conclude otherwise. 388
384. See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y., Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 6 (Nov. 28,
1980).
385. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (Nov.
28, 1980). See also Town of Hempstead, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
(May 1, 1981), aff'd on judicial review, Town of Hempstead v. Flacke, 82 A.D.2d
183, 441 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dep't 1981). In Hempstead, the applicant applied to
EnCon for a permit to deepen two wells in the northwest corner of a shopping center
on Long Island. The administrative law judge found that although the availability of
uncontaminated potable water on Long Island was not unlimited or
certain, he recommended the issuance of the requested permit on the ground that it
was justified by "public necessity." Id. at 1. In rejecting the administrative law
judge's recommendation, the Commissioner held that a "proper reading of public
necessity must address a broader context including the (1) nature of the uses (potable
vs. non-potable); and (2) relative importance of the water supply source." Id. Ana-
lyzing the issue in this "broader context," the Commissioner found that the use of
potable water for cooling purposes in a shopping center at the site would not be
deemed a public necessity, and he therefore denied the permit. Id. See also City of
Long Beach v. Flacke, 77 A.D.2d 638, 430 N.Y.S.2d 131 (2d Dep't 1980) (antecedent
to Hempstead) (petition to set aside permit granted and matter remanded to EnCon).
386. Town of Candor v. Flacke, 82 A.D.2d 951, 440 N.Y.S.2d 769 (3d Dep't
1981). In Town of Candor, the court held that "there is no necessity, as petitioners
seem to suggest, that an EIS make a determination that a project is needed. It is
sufficient that an EIS, as here, make only a statement regarding the need for the
action." Id. at 952, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71. See also Oneida County Energy Recov-
ery Facility, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 2 (April 5, 1983). In Oneida,
the Commissioner noted that the facility would benefit both region and state by
satisfying a public need to dispose of waste materials through conversion into steam
energy. The project also eliminated and therefore mitigated adverse consequences of
landfilling at three sites which were in violation of the law or the subject of enforce-
ment proceedings. Id.
387. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 6 (Sept
18, 1981) (Commissioner's observation that a private project will rarely satisfy public
need was made in reference to development of shopping centers). There are private
projects, however, that do fulfill a public need, as for example, the construction of
residential housing in a community desperately short of such housing. See Coalition
Against Lincoln West, Inc. v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170
(1st Dep't), aff'd, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 31, 1983, p. 12, col. 4. In Lincoln West, the
applicant applied to rezone a substantial parcel of property on the West Side of
Manhattan from manufacturing to residential use. The property was occupied by an
inactive railroad yard cluttered with obsolete and abandoned equipment, dilapi-
dated structures and a large accumulation of refuse. Id. at 489, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
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B. Making the Decision
SEQRA and the implementing regulations grant significant power
to the lead agency to achieve the law's policies and goals. 89 The lead
agency cannot discharge its responsibilities merely by noting the con-
sequences and risks associated with any particular proposed action.3 90
It must affirmatively state that the adverse environmental effects
revealed in the FEIS will be minimized or avoided by incorporating
appropriate mitigation measures as conditions to the decision. 39' The
authority granted to the lead agency implies that it has the power to
deny approval of a proposed action where the applicant fails to dem-
onstrate that mitigation measures will prevent a significant adverse
environmental impact.3 92
The only limitation on the lead agency's authority is that condi-
tions imposed on the permit must be reasonable in view of the objec-
tives to be achieved. 393 The subject of agency disapproval and permit
conditions is pivotal. Regardless of the magnitude of the private in-
vestment, a poorly conceived action may be either disapproved as
proposed or modified with such conditions as may be appropriate to
create an environmentally sound project.3 94
The New York City Planning Commission concluded that the creation of a major
waterfront park on land that is currently an environmental wasteland would be an
optimum land use and have a significant public purpose. Id. It also concluded that
the provision of new housing on the remainder of the site would be both an appropri-
ate land use and a significant addition to the housing stock of New York City. Id. At
the public hearings, the intervenors-objectants argued that the project would result
in overcrowding and traffic congestion, and would also reduce demographic diver-
sity within the upper West Side of Manhattan. The court found that the lead agency
had adequately considered the environmental impact on the community and that it
had fully complied with SEQRA, with the City Environmental Quality Review and
with the City's Uniform Land Use Review Procedure. Id. at 493, 465 N.Y.S.2d at
177.
388. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 5 (Sept
18, 1981).
389. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)
(policies and goals should be carried out to "the fullest extent possible"); [1982] 6
N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2)(ii). See also Town of Henrietta v. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.,
76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980) (applicant's challenge to EnCon's
imposition of conditions rejected).
390. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d at 223, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (4th Dep't 1980).
391. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(2).
392. See Orange & Rockland Utilities, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Apr.
13, 1982) (applicant failed to demonstrate that its proposed method of operation
would not cause significant adverse environmental impact, or that its mitigation
proposals would minimize or avoid likelihood of contamination of ground water).
393. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d at 224, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447.





If the applicant fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that its proposal meets SEQRA and other legal requirements, the
permit must be denied.39 5 Unlike an action in law, however, where an
adverse decision bars relitigation of the disputed issue, an applicant
may successfully reapply for a permit, assuming it can overcome the
defects and deficiencies of its prior application.196 In Pyramid Sys-
tems, Inc. ,397 an application for permits to develop a shopping mall in
the Town of New Hartford, Oneida County, EnCon denied permits
based on a finding by the adminstrative law judge that the applicant
had failed to prove it could mitigate or avoid adverse effects on the
freshwater wetlands located on the proposed site. 398 Upon reapplica-
tion, however, the freshwater wetlands permit was granted on the
grounds that the new proposal was significantly different and that the
environmental and related factors which led to rejection of the first
application were not present in the reapplication. 399
A permit will also be denied where the applicant shows lack of
concern for protection of environmental qualities.4"' In Bio-Tech
Mills, Inc.,401 an application for modification of a State Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit, the Commissioner
denied the application because the administrative law judge found
that the applicant had an unbroken continuous record of abusing its
permits. 40 2 The evidence was overwhelming that the applicant had
been unable or unwilling to operate its plant in a manner consistent
with environmental laws. 40 3
In addition, the lead agency is authorized to deny a permit if the
agency staff has concluded that expensive and time consuming tests
395. [1982] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.11(f).
396. Pyramid Systems, Inc., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Mar. 17,
1978) (application denied). On reapplication, the application was granted. Pyramid
Co. of Utica, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 22, 1979).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Pyramid Co. of Utica, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (June 22,
1979).
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are required to assess and evaluate environmental risk and that the
applicant has refused to make such tests.
40 4
2. Approval by Phase
The lead agency may approve a major project or activity in phases.
Two applications to EnCon illustrate this approach. The first applica-
tion requested permits to develop a resort hotel and conference cen-
ter, 40 5 and the second application requested a permit to convert elec-
trical generating facilities from oil to low sulphur burning coal. 406 In
the first, the applicant proved through hydrological and geologic
testing that it could provide sufficient quantities of water for a first
phase of development. 40 7 In order to proceed with each of the succes-
sive phases, however, the Commissioner held that the applicant
would have to conclusively demonstrate that the total supply of water
from its permanent wells would be sufficient to meet the total yearly
water demands for the entire project. 40 8
In the second application, the Commissioner approved the appli-
cant's request to convert two of its plants to allow the burning of low
sulphur coal, but in a manner different from that anticipated in the
applicant's petition. 409 As a result, the applicant would have to apply
for further permits to implement the design requirements approved by
the Commissioner and submit an acceptable solid waste management
plan for the disposal of ash and sludge waste produced by the pro-
posed activity. 410 The first applicant was allowed to undertake the
404. See, e.g., Town of Marbletown, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 4
(Oct. 21, 1982) (interim decision). On the basis of conflicting geological reports
EnCon staff requested that the applicant perform certain geologic testing which the
applicant acknowledged "could greatly simplify or resolve the most important re-
maining concerns." Id. The Commissioner noted that, while this matter was not
specifically raised by the parties, "it would be administratively inefficient to con-
clude the hearing in the absence of such tests." Id. The Commissioner concluded that
failure by the applicant to provide such information as would be derived from the
tests "will be considered grounds for denial of the application." Id.
405. See Marriott Corp., Marriott/Minnewaska Project, N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (June 2, 1981).
406. See Consolidated Edison Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 11-15
(Sept. 14, 1983).
407. See Marriott Corp., Marriott/Minnewaska Project, N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 3 (June 2, 1981).
408. Id.





first phase while planning for subsequent phases. In the second appli-
cation, however, the phase-by-phase approval required the applicant
to fully complete all of its submissions before undertaking capital
construction of any part of the proposed action.
3. Conditional Disapproval
In an application for multiple permits, an applicant may be able to
satisfy the environmental and technical requirements for some of the
permits but not for others. 411 The lead agency is not authorized,
however, to issue any permits until it has made an affirmative SEQRA
finding for the entire project. Therefore, even the permits for which
the applicant has proved its entitlement may not be issued. 412 The lead
agency, however, may request the applicant to submit additional
information 413 to demonstrate that it does have the ability to achieve
SEQRA and technical compliance. 414
If the lead agency concludes that, although there is substantial
evidence to support the issuance of a permit, the proposed project or
activity requires approval from an involved agency which could affect
the applicant's ability to undertake the project, the lead agency is
authorized to grant the permits but to stay their issuance. 415 In Pyra-
mid Crossgates Company,416 an application for permits in connection
with the construction of a regional shopping mall, the Commissioner
concluded that the applicant had successfully resolved issues relating
to the elimination of a freshwater wetlands, the impoundment of
certain bodies of water, storm water runoff discharges, a change in
certain community characteristics, the potential for unacceptable con-
centrations of carbon monoxide and adverse effects on procreation of
411. See, e.g., Pyramid Crossgates Company, N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv.
Dec. (Nov. 28, 1980).
412. See supra notes 308-32 for discussion of requirements concerning findings.
413. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 624.17(b) (further submissions can be requested to
secure additional information or data, or to consider significant new evidence or
major permit application alterations).
414. See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept. 18,
1981). The mitigation measures submitted by the applicant on its reapplication
satisfactorily demonstrated that safe levels of carbon monoxide would be maintained.
Id. at 1. The Commissioner denied intervenors-objectants' application to reopen the
adjudicatory hearing on the grounds that there was no purpose to debating over
variables about which reasonable men could interminably disagree. Id. at 2.
415. See Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Sept.
18, 1981).
416. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. (Dec. 3,
1982) (supplemental decision).
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an endangered species. 417 Because of the complex character of envi-
ronmental issues, however, significant conditions were imposed on the
permits. 41 8 Foremost among them was the condition that no construc-
tion of any kind would be permitted to commence until the Depart-
ment of Transportation, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over affected
roadways, determined final roadway design for the proposed project
and made its correlative affirmative SEQRA findings. 419 Upon satis-
faction of the conditions, the agency's stay dissolves and the applicant
is entitled to the issuance of the requested permits.
420
C. Imposing Conditions
EnCon regulations expressly authorize the imposition of conditions
that are necessary to create an environmentally sound project or
activity.4 2' Moreover, in view of the "clear legislative mandate" that
the FEIS be given a broad construction, it "follows that it applies to
the entire project and is not limited to the specific pending permit
applications. '" 422
The imposition of conditions on the permit is not intended to in-
fringe upon the authority of any other level of government, but rather
to fulfill EnCon's "responsibility under the [Environmental Conserva-
tion Law] to insure that the proposal is carried out in the least
environmentally-damaging manner." 423 This does not preclude any
other unit of government having jurisdiction from making its own
independent determinations and from imposing additional or differ-
ent requirements or conditions of approval based upon the FEIS if




421. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 430
N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
422. Id. at 222-23, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47. The court reached its decision through
an analysis of federal cases which support the conclusion that the impact statement is
not merely procedural and informative and that NEPA requires full consideration by
federal decision makers of the environmental consequences and project alternatives
indicated in the EIS. Id. at 220-21, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 445-46. The imposition of
conditions is a necessary corollary of this analysis; i.e., decision-makers must also be
prospectively oriented when they consider environmentally sensitive projects. Id. at
223, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447. See also San Diego Co., Archaeleogical Society v. Compa-
dres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1978) (after agency has approved a
project, it can enforce mitigating conditions necessary to protect environmental and
aesthetic interests by making them requirements for actual development).
423. Town of Henrietta, 76 A.D.2d at 219, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
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such requirements or conditions are consistent with each agency's
independent authority.424
In Town of Henrietta v. Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion,425 the applicant sought to set aside the conditions imposed by
EnCon. The court held that decision-makers are not "precluded from
forecasting future needs; indeed, they are encouraged to make reason-
able forecasts in the preparation of the [final] EIS.- 426 The imposition
of conditions necessary to minimize or avoid all adverse environmen-
tal impacts revealed in the EIS has a clear legislative mandate. 427
Because SEQRA was intended to grant decision-makers broad power
to achieve the directory policies and goals of the statute, the imposi-
tion of conditions is an approved means of balancing the various
competing factors that an agency must take into account. 428 For exam-
ple, the court has held that the imposition of energy conservation
conditions is not an improper interjection into the exclusive domain of
the State Energy Commission. 429 The lead agency has a statutory
obligation under SEQRA to analyze the project's effect on the use and
conservation of energy resources and to insure that the applicant
fulfills the objectives of the state's energy policy. 430
In addition, the lead agency may further condition its decision by
requiring the applicant to post a bond or letter of credit prior to the
commencement of work for the purpose of ensuring faithful compli-
ance with the terms of the permit and indemnifying the State for any
costs resulting from applicant's failure to comply. 43' The required
bond usually remains effective until the applicant has completed the
work to the lead agency's satisfaction. 432
V. Recommendations
In order for counsel to effectively advise its clients on SEQRA
compliance and opposition to permit applications, it must appreciate
both the interrelationship between the procedural requirements and
the substantive expectations each of the participants must satisfy in
424. Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 6 (Sept.
18, 1981).
425. 76 A.D.2d at 223, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447. The court cautioned, however, that
SEQRA must be construed in the light of reason. Id. at 224, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
426. Id.




431. [1981] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.14(e).
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the review process. The available educational resources do not gener-
ally focus the practitioner's attention on agency and court expecta-
tions, yet such knowledge is critical to the decisions a party has to
make in prosecuting or objecting to an application. Because EnCon
decisions deal with both the merits of an application and the sub-
stance of procedure, they are a valuable, but under-utilized resource.
They can be obtained from EnCon, or, for subscribers to the New
York Land Report, which provides substantial excerpts in its monthly
bulletin, from the New York Land Substitute. The decisions, together
with any ALJ reports, however, should be more freely available. The
Commissioner should remedy this situation by filing all EnCon deci-
sions in selected libraries throughout the state. This process can be
aided by the Environmental Law Section of the New York State Bar
Association, which should include in its Newsletter a section summa-
rizing recent EnCon decisions.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has examined the distribution of responsibilities, tasks
and burdens among the participants in the New York State environ-
mental review/permit request process. The purpose of the environ-
mental review is to expose a project's ."potential for adverse environ-
mental harm and establish measures which will avoid or minimize
such harm. '' 433 Although SEQRA spells out a process for obtaining
project approval, 434 it also expressly addresses substantive concerns. 435
SEQRA requires that the statutes, regulations and ordinances be ad-
ministered and interpreted "to the fullest extent possible" in accord-
ance with the policies set forth in SEQRA. 43 6 Those policies include
the declaration by the Legislature that all agencies have "an obliga-
tion to protect the environment for the use and enjoyment of this and
all future generations. '437 Since SEQRA's purpose is to ensure well-
planned projects which, when completed, will properly serve the
communities in which they are built, 438 those proposals which fulfill
432. See Town of Candor, 82 A.D.2d 951, 440 N.Y.S.2d 769 (in application to
construct and operate sanitary landfill, EnCon imposed $250,000 performance bond
to ensure development of alternative water system for neighboring residents and
other remedial measures should need arise).
433. Wilmorite Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 7
(Oct. 7, 1981).
434. N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsERv. LAW § 8-0107 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
435. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 430
N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't, 1980).
436. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
437. Id.
438. Wilmorite, Inc.: Rotterdam Square, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec. 7
(Oct. 7, 1981) (interim decision).
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the statutory expectations are most favored. The imposition of respon-
sibilities, tasks and burdens, therefore, is directed toward achieving a
particular aim: to create an environmentally sound project. 43 9
439. See, e.g., Pyramid Crossgates Co., N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Dec.
2 (Sept. 18, 1981) (the commissioner noted that public's participation had been
extremely beneficial to development of full record and to molding of environmentally
sound project).
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